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2005 Summer Study Abroad Programs in Brazil

LANGUAGE AND CULTURE
IN RIO DE JANEIRO
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June 25-August 6, 2005
Administered jointly with the
University of Florida

Study Portuguese at Rio's top private language school, the Instituto Brasil-Estados Unidos
(IBEU), in Copacabana. The program features lectures and cultural activities, as well as excursions to historical and cultural sites in the city and state of Rio de Janeiro.
For more information, visit the program website, www.clas.ufl.edu/users/cap/IBEU2005
or contact Dr. Timothy Power at (305) 348-3295, powertj@fiu.edu

PORTUGUESE LANGUAGE AND
BRAZILIAN CULTURE IN
BELO HORIZONTE
June 1-30, 2005

Held at the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (PUC Minas), one of the most
important and traditional universities in Brazil. Courses are taught by FIU and PUC Minas
faculty and include weekend excursions to historic towns such as Ouro Preto, Mariana and
Sabara to view the region's famous baroque art.
For more information, see the program website, www.fiu.edu/-modlang/pages/sap_brazil.htm
or contact Augusta Vono, Program Director, at (305) 349-2049, vonoa@fiu.edu
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even years ago, Alisa Newman became

managing editor of Hemisphere and of
all publications at the Latin American
and Caribbean Center. Alisa came to

us from LatinFinanceand promptly set out to
significantly improve the quality and style of the
magazine. I was especially impressed with the
breadth of knowledge she possessed of Latin
American and Caribbean affairs. As a result, she
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became more than a copy editor, she proposed
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that she established for the magazine.
This is the last issue of Hemisphere that bears
Alisa Newman's magical touch. She worked very
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closely with Timothy Power, the guest editor of
this issue to produce this outstanding collection
of articles on Brazil. Alisa announced shortly
before this issue was completed that she was leaving LACC and Hemisphere to concentrate on her

family. She and her husband Juan Carlos will be
parents to a second child this coming fall.
We were privileged to have worked with Alisa
and will miss her greatly. LACC wishes her well
and thanks her for the many years of dedicated
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effort she gave to Hemisphere. Her duties will be
assumed by Pedro Botta, who will also continue
to produce the magazine. I am delighted to welcome him as managing editor.

EDUARDO A. GAMARRA

bservers of Latin America are well aware that one country is responsible for nearly half of the
region's population and economy. With its continental dimensions, Brazil is large enough to warrant a Hemisphere of its own-and that, in fact, is what you have in your hands. In this special
issue, Hemisphere looks at developments in Brazil under its new, history-making president, Luiz
Inicio "Lula" da Silva.

Since his inauguration in January 2003, President Lula has seemed to be everywhere at once. Domestically, Lula
has continued the economic reforms of his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and has attempted to deliver
the magic formula that has proven elusive in Brazil's recent past-sustainable growth without inflation. Regionally,
Lula has become the linchpin in a new cooperative axis among the four Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil,
Chile and Uruguay), all of which now have socialist or progressive presidents for the first time in history. Globally,
Lula has worked tirelessly to maximize Brazil's visibility and influence in international affairs. Whether pressing the
flesh in a Rio favela, pushing paper in his third-floor office in Brasilia, or skirting the globe in his gleaming new
Airbus A-319, Lula is setting a new standard for activist leadership in Latin America.
This issue of Hemisphere explores Brazilian politics, economics, culture and society. My essay looks at the state of
Brazilian democracy on its twentieth anniversary in 2005. While the regime seems secure in terms of its basic survival, massive inequality and continual institutional stalemates erode the quality of the democracy that is being delivered to citizens. Ed Amann's essay on economic performance reviews the many obstacles that inhibit sustainable
development. Many economic challenges are related to the questdo social in Brazil, particularly the country's noted
inability to catch up with Asian competitors in terms of human capital. Roy Nelson explains why, despite its protectionist history, the Workers' Party (Partidodos Trabalhadoresor PT) has adopted a more favorable attitude toward foreign direct investment since coming to power in 2003.

Tanya Dawkins and Jim Green examine the PT's relationship to organized social movements. Dawkins shows that
Lula's decision to maintain the tight-money, low-inflation policies of his predecessor has led to disappointment within the progressive coalition that backed the PT during its two decades in opposition. The most vocal opposition to
Lulas policies has, in fact, come from the left, leading to important defections from the PT. Green's essay revisits
Brazil's authoritarian legacy and shows that even under the Lula government-which contains many important figures exiled and tortured by the military regime of 1964-1985-human rights activists are still waiting for a full
accounting of the past.
Two articles examine society and culture. In discussing the diffusion of Brazilian musical forms, Charles Perrone
shows why Brazil is "hot" in terms of its large-and growing-cultural influence. In fact, Lula's minister of culture,
Gilberto Gil, has been a dominant figure in world music over the past four decades. Rosana Resende's essay begins
by illustrating how these cultural influences are washing over South Florida, brought by many thousands of Brazilian
immigrants, and goes on to show the many difficult challenges faced by these new arrivals. The lives of these immigrants are dramatized in the Globo network's new telenovela, entitled simply America, which began running in March
2005 and features numerous scenes shot in Miami. Lula is a political figure here as well. On the day of his historic
election in October 2002, the lines snaking out of the polling station set up by the Brazilian Consulate at Coral
Gables High School showed that, politically speaking, Miami has become a Brazilian municipio like any other.
This issue showcases a photo essay by Ricardo Funari documenting life in the arid, impoverished sertdo of the
Brazilian Northeast, whence the future President Lula migrated to Sdo Paulo as a small boy. We also feature a book
review contributed by Hon. Donna Hrinak, the distinguished US Ambassador to Brazil from 2002 to 2004 and a
frequent visitor to FIU. Marian Goslinga closes the issue with a bibliography of new sources on Lula, the PT and
contemporary Brazilian affairs.
I am grateful to Dr. Eduardo Gamarra for the kind invitation to serve as guest editor of this special issue; to the
contributors for their fine essays; and to Pedro Botta and Alisa Newman for their advice and support along the way.
This will be Alisa's final edition of Hemisphere, and my regret at her departure is tempered only by the pleasure of
having worked with her on this special issue on Brazil.

TIMOTHYJ. POWER
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Fragile Threads
by Rosana Resende

It's

a balmy summer night and
hundreds of Brazilians gather
in front of an oversize movie
screen on a beach. Yet another
film festival is opening with a
free screening of the previous year's
Audience Award recipient. Later in

the festival, reporters from the
Brazilian network Rede Globo interview filmgoers as they wait. And
wait they must, in long, messy lines,
as promoters for events and products
such as alaiice cream and cachafa

roam the crowd plying their trade.
Surrounding establishments vie for
customers as the screening ends.
Perhaps some will go listen to live
Bossa Nova at a local jazz bar and
cafe, or savor pizza and caipirinhasat
the palm tree-lined outdoor mall
nearby. This particular film festival
draws thousands of people, including distribution executives from all
over the Americas, to see the best of
new Brazilian cinema. It is a power-

ful vehicle for disseminating
Brazilian art and culture.
Some miles away, perhaps less
trendy but no less exciting to its
patrons, a restaurant begins its weekend evening routine, turning down
the lights and opening the dance
floor for forrd night. The live band,
complete with accordion and triangle, essential forrd instruments, belts
out songs as the dancers glide by in
the familiar two-step of the Brazilian
northeast. There are men in cowboy
boots, women in tight, low-riding
jeans, and lots of beer. Some men
complain that the women prefer the
foreign men to the Brazilians, and as
there are many more men than
women here, the women can afford
to be choosy. Before midnight the
4
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numbers peak, crowding out from
the dance floor those eager to show
off fancy footwork and leaving only

Brazilians of South Florida? The
three southeastern counties of

sweaty bodies bumping up against

Miami-Dade, Broward and Palm

each other while trying to avoid

Beach are home to a sizable Brazilian

stepping on any feet. A typical
Saturday night in Brazil, you might

population, with estimates running
from 20,000 on the conservative end

think, and in fact none of this
would be remarkable were it taking
place in Rio, Salvador or Recife.
But I am describing a night in South
Florida.

to upwards of 200,000. The real
number, likely in the middle of this
range, is difficult to divine, as is the

Fragile Threads

These examples are only a few
manifestations of the expanding
Brazilian presence in South Florida,
but they encapsulate some striking
aspects of the Brazilian population
living in the area; namely, its diversity and geographical spread. Much

as in Brazil itself, Brazilians in South
Florida have little more in common
than language and nationality, and
in fact often seem to function in distinct and disjointed worlds divided
by social class, region of origin, faith
and, here in the United States, documents. To speak of a Brazilian
"community" in South Florida is
somewhat of a misnomer. The ethnic press echoes the sentiments of
many local Brazilians when it calls
for more community and complains
of a lack of solidarity. Large outpourings of national pride, evident
after World Cup soccer victories,
dissipate into fragmented preferences
and possibilities for just about everything else, from the trite (which
beach to hang out on) to the telling
(how often to visit Brazil). Nationality and language, as it turns out, are
rather fragile threads by which to
knit a community.

But just who, and where, are these

case with any immigrant population

that includes an undetermined number of undocumented persons.
What is certain, however, is that
varying concentrations of Brazilians

from all regions of Brazil live in this
area, from southern Miami-Dade
(Kendall) to northern Palm Beach
(Delray Beach). Pompano Beach

and Deerfield Beach in Broward
have whole strip malls of Brazilianowned and targeted businesses. The
tri-county area now boasts a public
school that offers a fully bilingual
curriculum with 40% of instruction
in Portuguese, two Brazilian cultural
centers, more than 30 churches and
temples, and countless restaurants,
stores, nightclubs and markets. This
immigrant stream includes the executives who organize events like the
Brazilian Film Festival, those who
attend it, and those who park the
cars of the moviegoers and clean up
the theater after hours. Three years
of researching this population in
Miami-Dade and Broward counties
have led me to conclude that
Brazilian immigration shows no sign
of stopping and only promises to

increase in size and diversity.
Tropical Brazucas
Renewed waves of disappointment

in Brazil as the purported "land of

Reports

Brazilians in South Florida

ture and broaden the geographical
reach. My research thus far indicates
three distinct points of origin, inherently diverse in their makeup. In

Since the 1980s, Miami has attracteda diverse lot of Brazilian immigrants.

the future" have ensured a steady
stream of people leaving the country
in search of opportunity and stability. Beginning in the early 1980s, on
the heels of democratization, intensifying with the disillusionment of the
post-Collor 1990s and beyond-as

both Cardoso and now Lula failed to
deliver a sustainable economic miracle-emigration has steadily become
a viable option for Brazilians, whose
image of their own country is that of
a land of immigrants.
According to Itamaraty, Brazil's
Ministry of Foreign Relations,
approximately two million Brazilians

live outside of Brazil. Brazilians are
scattered across the globe, with large
populations in Japan and Europe,

including many who gained entry by
heritage claim. But most Brazilians
living abroad headed north to
Canada and the United States, so
much so that Globo's new primetime
soap opera, entitled simply America,
specifically deals with the plight of
Brazilian immigrants. In the US,

several metropolitan areas boast significant populations of these trans-

plants, most notably New York,

Boston and Miami, with lesser concentrations in other cities.

Metropolitan Miami has received
large numbers of immigrants only in
the last 40 years or so, when a large
influx of Cubans fleeing Castro's revolution established the first significant enclave. Since the 1980s, however, the area has grown tremendously and attracted diverse populations
of Latin American and Caribbean
nationals, including Brazilians. Like
many immigrant groups in the area,
some of the first South Florida
brazucas, as Brazilians in the US are

sometimes called, were at the upper
end of the socioeconomic spectrum,
relocated by their companies or
drawn here by the large concentration of corporate Latin American

headquarters in Miami.
Even in its origins, the Brazilian

population in South Florida shows
diversity. This trend goes beyond the
eventual diversity of established communities, whereby ever-expanding
networks of employees and relatives
serve to verticalize the social struc-

addition to the corporate settlers,
other "pioneers" include tourism
industry workers and "snowbirds,"
Brazilians who previously settled in
points north and migrated southward in search of warmer weather.
These three trunks, if you will, in
turn led to different patterns of settlement and expansion, and different
chains of subsequent migrants. The
snowbirds, for example, pulled
Brazilians from other parts of the US
to follow them to sunny Florida.
And where they settled in South
Florida involved questions of space,
affordability and work opportunity.
One former hospitality worker I
met arrived in the 1970s and used to
spend six months a year working

legally in the resorts of Boca Raton
(catering to "traditional" snowbirds)
and the other six months in Brazil.
Eventually, he found stable, yearround work in downtown Miami,
but without proper work authorization, at a Brazilian restaurant that
catered to Brazilian tourists on vacation. He was able to bring his family
and settled in Broward County
because rent there was less expensive.
Over the years, he normalized his
family's legal status and eventually
came to provide food for Brazilians
in a different way, as the owner of a
Brazilian ethnic market for immigrants in Pompano Beach.

Misfits and Backstabbers
The diversity in points of origin
only partly explains the lack of social
cohesion among South Florida
Hemisphere Volume 15
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Brazilians. Another, more serious
challenge to community exists:
internal mistrust and disparagement.
Time after time, informants complain of a lack of community feeling

Other "misfits" like Vera, individuals clearly uneasy with their situation in the United States, believe in
a Brazilian social hierarchy that
places them in a different category

paragement and mistrust that char-

among Brazilians here, that they

than the people they find themselves

would do well to emulate the
"Latins" and unite for the common
good. These same informants insist
that they specifically avoid doing
business with Brazilians, or that
Brazilians can't be trusted. As evidence, I have been told horror stories of backstabbing, exploitation
and threats-of roommates who
steal each other's jobs, family members charging $50 for a car ride,
exorbitant rents, and employers who
refuse to pay their workers and
threaten to report them to immigration authorities should they complain. The climate of mistrust is
furthered as these cautionary tales
are told to newcomers. As extreme
as these experiences may be, however, a more pervasive threat is the
resistance on the part of many

lumped with here. They distinguish

eration and family structure. These
factors generate a multitude of com-

6

cultural level, versus purely material
gain, and employ a discourse of differentiation that further fragments
the community:

community by encouraging multiple

"Istoppedgoing to church because all
people talked about was how to get a
green card and how many houses they
cleaneda week. "
"You shouldn't interview me. I have
nothing in common with other
Brazilianshere. "
"We moved further north because
there were too many Braziliansin the
area."

Consider the story of Vera, once a
successful physician in Brazil. After
a messy divorce, she came to the US
to visit a sister and decided to stay.
She intended (and still hopes) to
obtain a license to practice medicine
here, but as a single mother she
needed a job compatible with her
son's school schedule, leaving her little time to learn English or study for
her boards. Today Vera works as a
babysitter. She spent most of our
interview complaining about life in

These are people whose current
economic capital is less than their
cultural capital, blocking their access
to wealthier Brazilian immigrants,
but they will not befriend other
countrymen in their situation. They
also find something lacking in their
social relations with Americans,
whom they consider somewhat distant. They complain of loneliness
and long for more friends, even
while avoiding friendships with
Brazilians. The social codes they
learned in Brazil are no longer applicable here, but they insist on maintaining them, focusing less on economic achievement or occupation
and more on their former status in
Brazil.

money.

Hemisphere Volume 15

regional traits, as well as gender, gen-

peting agendas and disjointed proj-

"Ourpeople arejust no good."

to the good old days of living in
Brazil. Like many other immigrants
who had careers in Brazil they cannot practice here, Vera insisted that
she had nothing in common with
the Brazilians who live here, describing them as mainly uneducated people whose only ambition is to make

are compounded by differences
brought from Brazil, faith and

themselves by prioritizing selfimprovement at an intellectual and

Brazilians here to be part of a larger
community.

the United States and comparing it

acterize Brazilians in South Florida

Order and Progress
The distinct points of origin, geo-

graphical spread, and internal dis-

ects, complicating the genesis of
factions that operate in isolation
from one another.
Despite these differences, Brazilian
immigrants display a remarkable
similarity and simplicity when the
topic turns to the pros and cons of
living in the United States. Whether
the respondents are happy to be here
or not, they invariably cite stability
and opportunity, safety and accountability as positive aspects of life in
the US. Here, they say, the laws are
respected and applied equally, and
everyone is treated with fairness and
respect. In the US they find the
ordem eprogresso ("order and
progress") emblazoned on the
Brazilian flag. All that order, however, comes at the cost of flexibility
and familiarity. Brazilians in the US
complain of robot-like efficiency
and of feeling like a number. The
truth is that despite all the negativity
toward other Brazilians, saudade
looms large: At heart everyone longs

for family and home, and the general warmth and friendship Brazilians
are famous for. Perhaps when they
begin to recognize that basic need in
their fellow brazucas, the Brazilians
of South Florida can begin to form a
community that bridges the gap
between forrd and bossa nova.
Rosana Resende is a PhD candidatein
culturalanthropology at the University
of Florida. She has presented and
publishedon the topic of Brazilian
immigration to South Floridaand coorganized the seminar "Braziliansoutside Brazil" at the University of
Miami in 2002.
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Bananas, Beats, Bossas
by Charles A. Perrone

n the opening scene of Primal
Fear (1996, dir. Gregory
Hoblit), a haunting song
plays. The voice is that of
Portuguese diva Dulce Pontes.
had
the good fortune to catch
She
the ear of lead actor Richard Gere in
Europe and he lobbied the directors
to use one of her recordings in the
film. The selection was "Cando do
Mar" (Song of the Sea), an appropriate title for a composition destined
to cross the ocean. This cinematic
chance opened the way for the
vocalist to enter specialty music
markets in North America more

attuned to the sonorous exports of
the Portuguese-speaking titan of
South America, Brazil. The movie

production aided Ponte's exposure in
the land of samba and Ipanema as
well. For his part, renowned singer-

songwriter Gilberto Gil gave a brief
solo musical performance at the
University of California Berkeley in
February 2005. His mini-show was

so short because he had come not as
a recognized icon of the popularmusic industry but to deliver an
address on contemporary Brazilian

culture in his capacity as minister of
culture in the Lula administration.
That appointment in itself speaks
volumes about the ascension of
expressive arts in the current govern-

ment. These two episodes nicely
illustrate diversification and transatlantic motion in the realm of contemporary popular culture. Where

music, Brazilian varieties and fortunes abroad are concerned, such
activity has at least a century of history behind it.
Ever since the birth of the industry, Brazil has been a major overseas

Brazilian popular music charms
the globe, still
client for sound recordings of
song/dance tunes produced in
Europe and the United States. The
tropical nation's celebrated musicmakers have always absorbed stylistic
influences and adapted non-native
elements to local forms. Responses
to the impact of foreign fashions,
notably Anglo-American, have been
evident in Brazilian songwriting
since the 1920s; related commentary

has often been sarcastic or humorous. Since the 1930s, vocalists and
musicians have traveled from Rio de
Janeiro and other cities in Brazil to
leave their marks abroad-New
York, Los Angeles, Paris, Japan,

Latin American capitals-as entertainers, composers, studio hands,
sometimes as actors, producers; in
sum, as players in different senses of
the word. The flamboyant Carmen
Miranda, actually Portuguese by
birth, was the ambassadress of
samba in the 1940s and 1950s on
stage and screen. The Lady in the
Tutti-Frutti Hat was associated with
Uncle Sam's Good Neighbor Policy
during World War II, as were, more

directly, the Latin American animated features of Walt Disney, Saludos
Amigos and The Three Caballeros,
which showcased Brazilian sounds.
The grand cinematic success Black
Orpheus (1959), a French film, was
tremendously influential in spreading images of Rio de Janeiro, carni-

val samba and incipient Bossa Nova.
The sophisticated samba-jazz of

Ant6nio Carlos Jobim and his newknack colleagues created a stateside
sensation in the early 1960s. Since
the mid 1980s, in turn, the US
media have speculated every couple

of years about the coming of a new
"Brazilian wave" or portrayed the
world's fascination with Brazilian
music as old favorites are remembered or new developments catch
the eyes and ears of consumers on
different continents.
In the first years of the twentyfirst century, the New York Times
weighed in frequently on issues of
Brazilian popular music and its performance in cosmopolitan venues,
the music business and publishing
circles. Of particular notice were
three translations of books on
Brazilian music. One was the nicely
illustrated Bossa Nova, the US ren-

dering of the bestselling Chega de
Saudade by journalist extraordinaire
Ruy Castro, an admirable account of
the epoch-making movement in
Brazil. (The Portuguese title is that
of the landmark 1958 song by Joao
Gilberto that was cast as "No More
Blues" in the US jazz repertory.)

The second book to merit attention
was Os Mutantes: The True Story ofa
Psychedelic Brazilian Rock Band,
which examines a 1960s trio that
became an object of keen interest in
the post-rock world in North
America. The third and most
prominent book, Tropical Truth, was
the Alfred Knopf-commissioned title
Hemisphere Volume 15

7

Reports

of Verdade Tropical, a memoir by
Caetano Veloso, the most renowned
of all active Brazilian singer-song-

writers. Along with Gilberto Gil,
Veloso led the eclectic sixties movement known as Tropicalism that

became the subject of numerous
specials in the North American
press, multilingual websites and academic treatises, such as Christopher

Dunn's Brutality Garden: Tropicilia
and the Emergence ofa Brazilian
Counter Culture (2001). Pondering
the international importance of his
field, Veloso writes: "Brazilian music

... is the most efficient means of
the worldwide affirmation of the
Portuguese language, so many are

the admirers who were conquered
by the sonorous magic of the word
sung in the Brazilian way." In addition to such proud statements,

Veloso writes of relations with the
big powers. Like so many artists
and intellectuals before him, he is

intrigued by parallels between his
land and the United States: "Brazil

is the other giant of America, the
other melting pot of races and cul-

tures, the other promised paradise
for European and Asian immigrants, the Other." Gil's diplomatic

missions around the Americas and
his current service in the Lula cabinet naturally draw attention,
national and international, to his
origins as a public figure in the

entertainment sphere, as well as to
the mature relationship between

official government channels and
popular musicians, many of whom
strongly supported Lula during his

decades of ascent as political leader.
Veloso's latest recording projects
are more about hemispheric rapport

and internationalization. In the late
1990s he assembled a repertory of
salient Spanish American songs and

Music icon Gilberto Gil was appointedBrazil's minister of culture by President
Luiz Indcio Lula da Silva in 2003. (Photo: Cristina Granato)

8
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toured in support of the album Fina
Estampa. One must remember that
the bolero was prominent enough
on the mid-century musical menu

Reports

of Brazil that a new hybrid genre
was spawned, the sambolero, a variant of the lyrical samba. The
breadth and Latin American spirit
of Fina Estampa are consistent with
Veloso's concerns for creative reprise
and global perspective. The venture
may have begun as a way by the
recording company to reach Pan-

American markets but it turned out
to be a most elegant exploit indeed,
both in the studio and on stage
(and live CD). A lesson to be
learned from this singer-songwriter's
many colorful roles is that show
business and art really can be mutually inclusive. Veloso further turned
the language issue on its head with
his 2004 release, A Foreign Sound,
an album consisting entirely of
compositions in English by such
songsmiths as Cole Porter, Neil
Sedaka, Kurt Cobain, Bob Dylan
and David Byrne.
No North American artist has

done more to promote current
Brazilian popular music than the
former leader of Talking Heads. In
1989, Byrne's solo label, Luaka Bop,
issued the landmark CD Beleza
Tropical, a compilation of artists of
the post-Bossa Nova sixties genera-

tion. This Brazil Classics series continued with a couple of genre
anthologies,

O Samba and Forrd Etc.

(traditional accordion-based northeastern dance music), followed by a
retrospective and new releases by
the eccentric pop composer and

experimental poet of sound, Tom
Zd, who won special recognition in
several music publications. Byrne
put together a Latin band and
toured with diva Margareth
Menezes, a proponent of neo-Afro-

Bahian axe music (a curious marketconscious use of the English noun
modified by a Yoruba word for "life
force"). The sponsorship of traditional and vanguard-inspired musical offerings from Brazil insured an
otherwise unthinkable exposure,

prompted distribution of the foreign-theme collections, and thrust
Brazilian tracks even further into
the whirlwind of so-called "world

sites linked to broadcasters). Chico
Science was one of the first
Brazilian acts to use digital commu-

music."
Since the mid 1990s, numerous

Internet, of course, has had a
tremendous and ever-increasing
impact on transnational flows of
music and music information. The
ever-diplomatic Gilberto Gil even
penned a clever tune, "Pela
Internet," that harkens back to the
official origins of samba as an urban

other US and UK artists-perhaps
most notably the sui generis Beckhave demonstrated particular interest in aspects of Brazilian popular
music. One extremely interesting

case of new sounds in the 1990s
was an ethno-pop movement in the
northeast called Mangue Beat
(mangue is the shantytown mangrove wetland in the city of Recife).
If most Brazilian rock of the 1980s
did not stray too far from metropolitan models, this local version privileged regional difference, overlaying
funk, hip hop, and metal onto folk
forms, principally the percussion
heavy African-derived carnival practice known as maracatu. The centerpiece of this postmodern flourish
was Chico Science & Naio
Zumbi, a group plenty aware of tradition but that identified with global youth culture and cyberspace. As
evidence of its "globalized" enterprise, the group sent its first album
to music festivals and promoters
abroad, winning a contract from
Sony Music, which successfully
marketed this fresh "world music."
Chico Science & Nagao Zumbi
appeared at the Montreux Jazz

Festival, CBGBs (a key site of the
New York underground rock scene),
and the Central Park Summer Stage
in New York, which led to a lengthy
feature on National Public Radio.
NPR's Afropop Worldwide program, it is worth noting, has a
whole sub-catalogue of Brazilian
shows, including more recent ones
on soul and Jorge Ben Jor (of "Mais
que Nada" fame). Conventional
media like radio are now greatly
complemented by virtual vehicles
(for example, the website
afropop.org and endless Brazilian

nication to great advantage. The

popular form. Brazil has kept up an
outstanding presence in Internet-

based aspects of cultural interaction,
particularly those related to popular
music. The surge of dot-com data
and e-commerce since the 1990s, as
well as the burgeoning aficionado
domains, have truly enhanced access
to, and the growth of, all kinds of
Brazilian popular music around the
globe-acoustic instrumental repertories (carioca choro), samba schools
(Japan to Sweden), Lusophone
brands of rap (and reggae!), lounge
and neo-Bossa Nova (Bebel
Gilberto), original house tracks
(hear London!)-even, when the
stars are aligned appropriately, in
the theaters of Miami Beach. As for
the Internet, Gil's recent happen-

ing-engaging address, provocative
discussion, and charming musical
moments-is archived (http://
webcast.berkeley.edu/events) for all
to relive and contemplate. U

CharlesA. Perrone is a professor of
Portugueseand Luso-Brazilian literature and culture in the Department of
Romance Languages and Literatures
at the University of Florida, where he
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Latin American Studies. He is coeditor with ChristopherDunn of
Brazilian PopularMusic and
Globalization (University Press of
Florida,2001)

Hemisphere Volume 15

A

Brazilian Democracy at Twenty
by Timothy J. Power

O

Brazil's last military

n
March General
15, 1985,
dictator,
Joio
Figueiredo, quietly

slipped out the back
door of the presidential palace.
Figueiredo had refused to hand the
presidential sash to Jose Sarney, who
was sworn in moments later as the
first civilian president in more than
20 years. It is difficult to believe that
20 years have passed since that fateful day. On March 15, 2005,
Brazilians quietly celebrated the
beginning of a third decade of democratic rule. On the anniversary of
the political transition, in the same
third-floor office once occupied by
the generals who jailed him, sat
President Luiz Inicio Lula da Silva,
the symbol of a new Brazil. The
democratic regime founded in 1985
is now Lula's laboratory. This essay
reviews some of the enduring challenges to Brazilian democracy but
also highlights some good news not
necessarily in the headlines.

legislature (in 2005, 10 different par-

ties. The personalization of elections

ties support Lula). Brazilian political
scientist Sdrgio Abranches has given
this system a name: presidencialismo
de coalizao, or coalitional presidentialism. Although presidencialismode
coalizdo bears a superficial resemblance to parliamentarism, there is a
key difference: The survival of the
government in office does not
depend on the loyalty of the nominal

extends to campaign finance, making
Brazilian elections staggeringly

supporters of the president. Parties

can and do abandon the president
on key votes. A telling example
occurred in February 2005, when

despite having built a massive progovernment coalition in the
Chamber of Deputies, the Lula government could not secure the election of its preferred candidate for
speaker. Presidencialismode coalizdo
is unwieldy and legislative support
comes at a high price. Make no mistake: This is still presidentialism, but
a very different type than the comparatively user-friendly, two-party
format practiced in the United
States.

Challenges to Democracy
Many of the key problems of
Brazilian democracy are institutional
in nature. Brazil has one of the most
fragmented party systems in the
world, making it a virtual certainty
that a president will not control a
majority of the seats in Congress.

Currently, the Workers' Party (PT),
founded by President Lula, controls
only 18% of the seats in the lower
house. Given the mathematics of
Congressional support, Brazilian
presidents must behave like
European prime ministers and fash-

ion multiparty cabinets and multiparty voting blocs on the floor of the
10
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One of the reasons for the unpredictability of presidencialismode coalizdo is the weakness of Brazil's party
system. Except for a handful of parties on the left-Lula's PT is by far
the most important-the parties are
largely devoid of ideology and discipline. Most catch-all parties have
weak organizations, generic platforms and low levels of continuity.
In a typical four-year Congress, more
than one in three federal legislators
will switch parties, some more than
once. Elections are largely an individual affair and politicians often
believe that their mandate belongs to
themselves rather than to their par-

expensive. Current electoral laws
favor high fragmentation, low institutionalization of parties and minimal party fidelity.
Two other institutional challenges
to Brazilian democracy are executivelegislative relations and robust federalism. Presidents control much of
the agenda-setting power in Brazil.
More than 75% of all legislation
adopted since 1985 has originated in
the executive branch, often via presidential decrees. Presidents also have
a high level of discretion over public
spending; Congress can only authorize the budget, while it is up to the
executive to actually disburse it. The
reactive status of Congress makes legislative life unappealing to many
ambitious politicians. Their preference for executive office is understandable in the context of Brazilian
federalism; the 1988 constitution
returned more than half of central
revenues to states and municipalities,
making subnational offices (the 5500
mayoralties and especially the 27
governorships) extremely attractive.
Subnational executives control budgets and have the power to hire and
fire, the essence of Brazilian political
careers. State governors are vastly
important; since they often dominate
their state delegations to Congress,
presidents must negotiate with them
continually, especially with regard to
expenditures and debt. Lula's predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso,

drafted a Fiscal Responsibility Law
and forced the privatization of several profligate state banks, but problems of federalism continue to lend
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A look at Lula's laboratory

I

Members ofthe Brazilian honor guardsalute PresidentJose Sarney as he leaves JaburuPalace in May 1985. Sarney was Brazil's
first civilian president in more than two decades.

an air of unpredictability to national
politics.

legislative support, while at the subnational level politicians line up in

Given these imbalances of power,
the institutional design of Brazilian

vertical chains of command extend-

democracy favors a strongly clientelistic style of politics. All political

systems have patron-client relations,
but in Brazil the concentration of
power in the executive branch creates

a small number of patrons and a very
large number of potential clients. At

the national level, the dynamics of
presidencialismo de coalizdo require
presidents to offer cabinet portfolios
to different parties in exchange for

ing from municipal mayors through
state governors to the powerful presidency. These horizontal and vertical

relationships are lubricated by favors,
jobs and pork. The rules of the
game are known to all political actors
and compliance with them is
unavoidable. After 20 years of excoriating "traditional politics," since
taking office in 2003 the PT has had
no choice but to follow the timehonored practices of exchanging jobs

and resources for support from governors and legislators. This reality
has dismayed many of Lula's longtime supporters.

Not all of the obstacles to democratic consolidation in Brazil derive
from political institutions, of course.
Towering challenges to democracy
are posed by massive poverty,
inequality and social exclusion.
More than a quarter of the population is under the official poverty line.
Brazil has one of the worst income

distributions in the world: The
wealthiest 10% control 48% of
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national wealth, while the poorest
10% control less than 1%. Per capita income has stagnated in recent
years and unemployment has proven
largely intractable to both the
Cardoso and Lula governments.
Economic growth, astounding in the
1950-1980 period, slowed dramatically in the 1980s and was low and
erratic throughout the 1990s. The
prospects for a sustained recovery in
the second half of the current
decade, Edmund Amann argues in
this issue of Hemisphere, are still very
much in question. These dismal
economic results are difficult to
accept for the many Brazilians who
remember the glory days of the postwar expansion. As the journalist Elio
Gaspari recently pointed out, if the
average 7% growth rate between
1950 and 1980 had been maintained
up to the present day, Brazil would
now have a per capita income on par
with that of Spain.
The simultaneous pressures of
poverty, inequality and social exclusion mean that Brazilian democracy
is under constant stress. Important
pockets of urban Brazil, especially
favelas where drug trafficking is rampant, effectively escape state control.
Meanwhile, in the countryside,
agrarian pressures have led to violence and standoffs between
landowners and the Landless
Workers' Movement (MST).
Poverty and social exclusion cause
Brazil to continue to underproduce
in the area of human capital, the
undisputed key to today's global
economy. Due to unequal access to
higher education, Brazil's enrollment
rate lags behind that of its regional
neighbors and especially that of
Asian competitors. Some 90% of
Brazilian households have a television set, but newspaper circulation
per capita in Brazil is one-third the
level of Argentina or Chile. The
production of education and marketoriented skills is arguably the biggest
12
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single challenge to Brazilian social
policy today. As a cover story in the
newsweekly Veja put it in early 2005,
"If South Korea can do it, so can
Brazil."
Given lackluster economic performance and the persistence of
social inequalities, it is perhaps not
surprising that public support for
democracy in Brazil is low in comparative perspective. Each year, the
Latinobardmetro polling organization asks citizens throughout Latin
America whether they think democracy is the best form of government,
whether an authoritarian regime
could sometimes be preferable, or
whether it doesn't matter to them.
In 2003, support for democracy in

Brazil stood at 35%, the second lowest level in Latin America after
Guatemala, with 33%. (The average
for 17 countries was 53% support).
Some 55% of Brazilians were either
indifferent to the regime type or
openly authoritarian; only Paraguay
at 60% ranked higher on the percentage of nondemocrats. While
these numbers do not necessarily
imply trouble in the short term-in
the same poll, Brazilians showed
strong support for the Lula government-in the long run, any political
regime must develop a supportive
cultural system or risk breakdown
when confronted by crisis. Clearly,
Brazilian democracy has not yet
developed deep roots at the level of
mass opinion.
Achievements of the Democratic
Regime Since 1985
The challenges to democracy are
immediate and real. However,
democratization since 1985 has also
achieved some undeniable successes
and continues to benefit from certain
favorable conditions. The economic
backdrop to democracy, while unappealing in terms of poverty and
income distribution, has clearly
improved on one important score:

price stability. In 1994, Cardoso's
introduction of the PlanoReal gave
Brazil a stable currency for the first
time in memory. The annual inflation rate fell to single digits after
1995, compared to an 80% monthly
rate in 1990. Although dented by
the 1999 devaluation, the Real has
held up reasonably well and celebrated its tenth anniversary in July 2004.
One should not underestimate the
degree to which stabilization has
removed inflationary populism from
national politics and benefited ordinary Brazilians.
Another point in the regime's favor
is that while public support for
democracy is weak, active opposition
to democracy is even weaker. It is
difficult to conceive of any antidemocratic or anti-system actor with
any real presence in national politics.
Take the military, for example. In
the 1946-1964 period, the armed
forces intervened in politics on several occasions; after the 1964 coup
they governed directly for 21 years;
and during the first postauthoritarian
government of Jose Sarney (19851990) they often acted as veto players. Today, after 15 years of eroding
budgets and civilian encroachment
upon its prerogatives, the military is
politically impotent. In 1999,
Cardoso created the nation's first
civilian Ministry of Defense, a position that has been maintained by
Lula. Comparing the 2002 presi-

dential race to the first direct election
held under democracy in 1989, in
which Lula was a finalist, is instructive. In 1989, the military, the peak
business association (FIESP), and the
powerful Globo television network
all actively opposed Lula, leading
many to wonder if he could have
taken office if he had won. In the
2002 presidential campaign, these

three conservative actors were largely
invisible. On the left as well there is
little active opposition to democracy.
In terms of elite commitment to
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democratic procedures, the regime
has improved remarkably since the
late 1980s.

Brazilians are justifiably proud of
their consolidation of the electoral
side of democracy. Since the 1980s,
the country has undergone one of
the fastest expansions of the franchise
in the world. In 1955, the electorate
as a share of the population was
25%; in 1975, close to 41%; and in
2005 it is about 64%. In absolute
terms, the electorate is approaching
an astounding 120 million people.
Because of compulsory voting,
Brazil's raw turnout in presidential
elections will soon exceed that of the
United States. This expansion has
been led by the electoral management board (TSE), which is recognized for its professionalism and
impartiality. Beginning in 1996,
Brazil adopted an electronic voting
system capable of tallying 100 million presidential votes before midnight on election day.
The expansion of political participation has coincided with a remarkable growth in the organizational
density of civil society, which in turn
is transforming the nation's politics,
economy and culture. As Tanya
Dawkins's article in this issue makes
clear, social movements, NGOs,
unions, churches, neighborhood
associations, and racial and gender
advocacy groups are remarkably
vibrant. These transformations
"from below" constitute arguably the
most striking difference between the
current regime and the previous
democratic experiment in 19461964: Today, a vibrant and diverse
network of fully autonomous secondary associations provides a countervailing force against state power.
Together with the dynamic and
aggressive news media, the new civil
society has helped promote increasing openness and transparency in
Brazilian politics, as was evident in
the impeachment of President

Fernando Collor de Mello in 1992.
This is not to say that corruption
has been eradicated-far from itbut the cost of engaging in such
behavior is higher than ever before.
Impressionistic evidence suggests that
societal tolerance of corrupt politicians-once captured in the revealing phrase rouba masfaz (he steals,
but he gets things done)-has
declined dramatically over the past
decade.
Although the party system continues to earn criticism, there are some
signs that it is consolidating. The
last three presidential elections have
been fought between the same two
parties, the Party of Brazilian Social
Democracy (PSDB) and the PT.
The 2002 candidates, Josh Serra
(PSDB) and Lula (PT), were both
committed "party men" who had
spent 14 years and 22 years, respectively, in parties that they themselves
created. This is remarkable. Both of
these political parties are legitimate,
experienced power contenders with
clear visions for Brazilian development and both have deep reservoirs
of talent. The fact that they have
now alternated in power is a major
achievement for Brazilian democracy.
Lula's victory in 2002 essentially

"rebooted" the democratic regime,
creating a refreshing new context
wherein all of the major parties have
now been both in government and
in opposition. The conservative
Liberal Front (PFL), which robotically supported virtually every government since 1964, is now learning
what it is like to live without the
lifeblood of state patronage. Conversely, the leftist PT, always partial
to a loud, aggressive, confrontational
style during its two decades in the
wilderness, is learning that it is easy
to oppose but much harder to govern. Since all of the major parties
have now had their turn at governing
a complex society, elite political culture is likely to become increasingly

consensual and pragmatic. Political
learning matters.
Finally, one of the major advantages of Brazilian democracy over the
past decade has been strong leadership. In the transition from Cardoso
to Lula, Brazil moved from one history-making president to another. It
is difficult to think of another Latin
American country that has had two
consecutive presidents of a similar
stature. The fact that they worked
together against military dictatorship
in the 1970s, opposed one another
in the democratic 1980s and 1990s,
and pulled off the most professional
presidential transition in Latin
American history in 2002-2003 is
nothing but good news for the sustainability of democracy. Although
Cardoso and Lula have many policy
differences, they have three essential
similarities: They are modernizers,
they are institution-builders, and
they are antipopulists. Together they
have significantly revised the old reputation of the Brazilian presidency as
a magnet for personalists, populists
and demagogues. Both employed a
"team" style of government with
deep benches of talent and were
unafraid to delegate important tasks
to professionals, and both reached
across the aisle to ally with parties
that were formerly anathema to
them. Although presidencialismode
coalizdo remains an unwieldy system
of governance, there is no doubt that
first Cardoso and now Lula have
found some ways to make it march
forward in the face of daunting challenges. These two statesmen must
continue to work together, for it is
their combined legacy that will shape
democracy's third decade and
beyond. U
Timothy J Power is associateprofessor
ofpoliticalscience at FloridaInternationalUniversity andpresidentof
the Brazilian Studies Association
(BRASA).
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A New Era for Brazil's Economy?
by Edmund Amann

a

President Luiz Inicio

T

r''

Lula da Silva in
October 2002 repre-

he election
of
sented
a milestone
in
terms of the consolidation of
democracy in Brazil. Here, appar-

ently, was incontrovertible evidence
that Brazilian political culture had
matured to the point that the electorate at large-and not just a radicalized fringe-could embrace an
ostensibly left-leaning candidate
rather than opt for the centrist
continuity offered by the social
democratic alternative. If nothing
else, Lula's triumph demonstrated
that the unspoken fears of instability and, in extremis, possible mili-

tary intervention that had stymied
previous attempts by the left to
gain the presidency had, by 2002,
abated.
Once the dust had settled after

r¢

the election, attention began to

refocus on the new administration's
policy agenda. The most acute
area of concern, especially among
international investors, related to
Lula's proposed economic reform
package. In the run-up to the election, Lula's campaign had spared

no effort in pointing to the deficiencies of the Cardoso administra-

tion (1995-2002), especially as
regarded its record in fostering sustained, socially equitable growth.
To address what it sees as this
unsatisfactory record, the Lula
administration has committed itself
to a multi-track approach that
combines fiscal and monetary
orthodoxy with a raft of measures
designed to tackle poverty head on.
At the same time, the government
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Brazil's economics ministerAntanio Palocci.
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The Lula administration tackles the
challenge of structural change
has embarked on a program of
structural reforms designed to
bring about a step change in supply-side performance. The Lula
administration is attempting to
tackle ingrained economic problems while, through the pursuit of
macroeconomic orthodoxy, simultaneously seeking to avoid alienating powerful investor groups. The
major question is whether such a
strategy can be effective given the
contradictions that may exist
between adhering to macroeconomic orthodoxy, on the one hand,
and promoting socially equitable
structural economic reform, on the
other.

momentum could not be sustained
into the mid 1970s, when oil price
hikes led to an international recession. During the boom years,
moreover, social inequality had
increased sharply. By the mid
1980s and the return to civilian
rule, the economy was once again
in profound difficulties as the debt
crisis and hyperinflation took their
toll. Since 1994, a combination of
increased economic openness and a
new monetary policy framework
has done much to dampen inflation; however, growth in the past
five years has proven highly unstable and the gap between rich and
poor remains wide.

Lula's Economic Inheritance
In order to grapple with this
question, a brief review of the characteristics of the Brazilian economy
is essential. Throughout the postwar period, the economic development of Brazil has been marked by
profound instability. After generally impressive growth in the 1950s
under an energetic program of
import substitution industrialization, by the beginning of the following decade, output had begun
to fall off and inflation to rise.
Without question, the growing
economic instability of this period
was one of the triggers for the military coup of 1964. Over the next
two decades, the military fared little better than its civilian predecessors in steering the economy onto
a path of long-term sustainable
growth. Brazil enjoyed rapid
growth between 1967 and 1973 as
the result of a substantial industrialization and export drive, but this

The Fundamental Economic

Challenge
Reviewing this experience, two
essential (and related) features
stand out. First, unlike its newly
industrialized counterparts elsewhere (the "Asian Tiger" economies,
for example), Brazil has proven
incapable of delivering steady,
rapid growth. Instead, periods of
boom (frequently lasting no more
than one or two years) are swiftly
followed by periods of bust.
Second, and stemming in part
from the lack of sustained growth,
widespread poverty and inequality
have continued to characterize the
Brazilian economy.
These perennial features of
Brazilian economic life have constituted a key challenge for policy
makers over the years. More often
than not, however, the need to
generate sustained, equitable
growth has been subordinated to
more immediate objectives, such as

controlling inflation or the external
valuation of the currency.
Macroeconomic fire-fighting,

rather than systemic measures
aimed at promoting equitable
growth, has been the order of the
day. Fortunately, realization has
grown that this approach to economic management, akin to tackling symptoms rather than causes,
cannot offer a lasting solution to
Brazil's economic problems. To
this end, policy makers have begun
to focus on the structural constraints that impede steady, equitable growth.
Of these constraints, the most
obvious are constituted by external
and fiscal deficits. In both cases,
Brazil has historically found it difficult to realize sustained economic
expansion without the current
account moving sharply into deficit
or the burgeoning government
deficit-through its call on savings
to service existing debt-choking
off resources for further productive
investment. As a result, economic
growth has rarely been able to proceed steadily and consistently.
Instead, faced with a widening
external deficit and the threat of
currency depreciation and imported inflation, the authorities have,
more often than not, opted to slam
on the brakes by raising interest
rates and reducing public expenditure on all activities not directly
related to debt service.
One of the constraints that most
seriously affects Brazil's growth performance is its poor record on
investment. Particularly over the
past 20 years, Brazil's investment as
a proportion of GDP has tended to
Hemisphere Volume 15
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lag behind that of its main competitors. Not surprisingly, therefore, Brazil has had difficulty
matching the growth performance
of, say, South Korea or China. At
the same time, the legacy of underinvestment has imposed capacity
limitations that are soon met once
growth accelerates. This, of course,
contributes to the stop-go pattern
of growth. The reasons underpinning Brazil's subdued investment
performance are complex; however,
two factors stand out: the absorption of scarce domestic savings into
non-productive public sector
spending, and structural deficiencies in domestic capital markets.
Another fundamental structural
constraint is poor productivity
growth in the Brazilian economy.
One of the secrets of the success of
the East Asian Tiger economies was
their efficient use of capital and
labor resources during their rise to
prominence. This enabled them to
deliver far higher growth-and
ultimately higher living standards-than would otherwise have
been possible. Central to this
achievement was a determination
to invest in education, a commitment that not only facilitated the
development and adoption of efficient management techniques but
also made the workforce more productive. Unfortunately, Brazil's
efforts to improve productivity-or
to invest in human capital through
education-have not matched
those of its competitors in Asia and
elsewhere, despite the fact that
Brazilian industry has been forced
to improve its competitiveness in
response to the trade liberalization
initiated in the late 1980s.
The final constraint-and one
explicitly connected to the issue of
social equity-concerns the degree
to which the economic growth that
has been achieved has had differential impacts upon the rich and
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poor. Throughout the postwar
period, one of the central features
of the Brazilian economy has been
the unequal division of the fruits of
growth and development. Many
factors help account for this imbalance, including the skewed nature
of public spending (disproportionately favoring the salaried middle
classes) and the highly uneven preexisting distribution of assets, especially land. As a result, significant
sectors of the population have been
largely bypassed by the improved
income and living standards that
have benefited other groups. While
clearly undesirable from any progressive normative standpoint, the
existence of such widespread poverty, through its malign impacts on
productivity and participation in
the formal economy, acts in itself
as a limit on growth potential.
Thus, it can be argued, alleviating
poverty and inequality is justified
not only in altruistic terms but also
in terms of its potential to raise
economic performance.
The Policy Response
The Lula administration has
been quick to grasp the importance
of tackling these structural constraints. Indeed, their removal
now forms a fundamental plank of
the government's economic strategy. The government has attempted, as did the preceding Cardoso
administration, to improve the performance of public sector accounts
by reducing the social security
deficit through structural and indirect tax reform. The goal is to create more space for spending on
much needed investment projects
and poverty alleviation. So far,
however, the reforms have had only
limited effects, while high interest
rates have increased debt servicing
expenditures.
Concerned about the historical
tendency of the current account

balance to move into the red once
the economy picks up speed, the
Lula administration has launched a
series of initiatives aimed at boosting export performance. The most
important of these provide
increased export financing. The
administration also has made strenuous efforts to improve market
access for Brazilian exporters, not
least by pursuing trade deals with
China and other East Asian
economies. On the face of it, the
government's export promotion
drive appears to be working, at
least if trade balance figures are
used as a measure of success.
Between 2003 and 2004, Brazil's
full-year trade surplus increased

from US$24.8 billion to US$33.7
billion. Of course, it should be
stressed that Brazil, with its huge
natural comparative advantages in
natural resource-based goods, is
faring very well from the current
boom in global industrial commodity prices, in particular those
for iron ore, steel and other metallic products. The question is
whether the government's initiatives will be sufficient to support
other areas of export activity once
the commodities boom subsides, as
it is expected to do in the course of
2005. On this score, the outlook
is uncertain. While Brazil has
developed substantial competitive
advantages in certain higher valueadded exports (automotive products and jet aircraft, in particular)
the picture in other sectors is less
favorable.
Any widespread improvement in
export performance will of course
partly depend on addressing the
productivity constraint identified
earlier. Here again, the prospects
for success are uncertain. By continuing the relatively open trading
regime of its predecessor, the current government will ensure that
adequate competitive pressure is
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placed on enterprises to maintain
the incentive for productivity performance. However, with rates of
productivity growth in competitor

countries tending to outpace those
of Brazil (and from a higher base),
government policy must promote
more substantial improvements in
performance. So far, the indicators
are relatively encouraging. The
Lula administration is committed
to promoting more intensive
research and development within
enterprises while offering financing
initiatives to support fixed capital
investment. The latter development should in time lead to the
introduction of upgraded capital
equipment with favorable consequences for productivity. Turning
to the issue of investment more
broadly, the government has taken
a bold step toward improving availability of capital through a new
bankruptcy law (approved in
December 2004). Its streamlined

insolvency procedures may lower
interest rates for borrowers, but
high domestic interest rates and the
continued heavy absorption of
domestic savings into public sector
debt servicing are likely to place
constraints on the ability of investment to expand.
Undoubtedly the most politically
sensitive constraint concerns pover-

ty and inequality. In the 2002
election campaign, Lula and his
Workers' Party did much to ensure
popular support by committing
themselves to a program of social
reform and poverty alleviation.
The central elements of this platform were improved investment in
primary education and a series of
direct poverty reduction initiatives
which have come to be known as
Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) and
Bolsa Famlia (Family Grant).
These initiatives, which were introduced in 2003, involve a range of
measures, including the provision

of food cards for needy families
and investment in social infrastructure in deprived communities.
While broadly welcomed at home
and abroad, the initiatives soon ran
into practical problems that
stemmed not only from flaws in
their design but also from funding
shortfalls. The fiscal constraints
that have restricted the extent of
the anti-poverty programs have also
limited the government's efforts to
raise investment in primary education, a major target of the reformers. As a result, frustration has
grown among Lula's core supporters that the rhetoric of crusading
social reform and poverty alleviation is running ahead of the reality.

The Way Ahead
The funding problems accompanying official efforts to tackle
poverty (and to invest elsewhere to
remove other constraints on
growth) illustrate a certain tension
at the heart of the current government's agenda. On the one hand,
the government is anxious not to
unsettle investors. For this reason,
it has adopted strict IMF-agreed
fiscal targets while retaining a tight,
counter-inflationary monetary policy. Without question, these poli-

cies have been successful to the
extent that inflation has remained
in check and growth (which is estimated at 5% for 2004) has
rebounded from a dismal performance in 2003. On the other hand,
the government's macroeconomic
stance is limiting its ability to tackle the structural constraints that
ultimately need to be overcome if
growth is to be sustained well into
the future. This limitation takes
on a number of concrete forms.
The pursuit of tight fiscal policy in
itself reduces the scope for investing in such areas as education,
poverty alleviation and export promotion. When combined with

high interest rates (which increased
yet again in the final quarter of
2004) the fiscal limitation is all the
greater, since high debt-servicing
costs can tend to squeeze out other
public expenditures. At the same

time, the high interest rates discourage private investment projects. Tackling the investment constraint, therefore, becomes increasingly difficult.
Of course, it should not be suggested that orthodox macroeconomic policies are keeping the Lula
government from making progress
on its structural constraint agenda.
Real signs of change are evident;
however, the gravity of the structural problems facing the economy
(especially as regards poverty)
means that more rapid and concerted action is needed. If this
opportunity is lost, then the current improvement in Brazil's economic fortunes is likely to be, as so
often in the past, only a blip. U
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Rethinking Foreign Investment
by Roy C. Nelson

T

New York to speak with institutional
Workers' Party (PT)

raditionally,
Brazil's
and its leader,
current

president Luiz Inicio
("Lula") da Silva, were
characterized by a somewhat antagonistic stance toward foreign investment and capitalism in general. Yet

during the presidential campaign of
2002, and after taking office in
2003, Lula moderated his position.
Lula now actively promotes foreign
investment and strives constantly to
reassure the foreign business community of Brazil's suitability as a
place to invest its capital. Why did
this happen? This article examines
the ways political experience at the
sub-national level has shaped the
PT's national policies since 2003.

Background
In the 1970s, as a leader of the
Metalworkers' Union of Sao
Bernardo do Campo, a suburb of
Sao Paulo where automobile firms
such as Volkswagen, Mercedes and
Ford had large plants, Lula led
strikes against foreign firms and
denounced their actions with fiery,
radical rhetoric. As one of the
founders of the socialist PT in 1980
and as the PT candidate for president in 1989, 1994 and 1998, Lula
spoke out against privatization,
promising to put a stop to the sale
of Brazil's state-owned firms to foreign investors.
In his successful campaign for
president in 2002, however, Lula's

position on this issue changed. He
adopted a much more moderate
stance. During the campaign, Lula
went out of his way to reassure foreign investors. He even traveled to
18
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money managers and Wall Street

investment bankers about his views,
assuring them that, if elected, he
would implement investor-friendly
policies.
Since taking office in January
2003, Lula has kept these promises.
Signaling his rapprochement with

the business community, he
appointed prominent executives to
key posts in his government.
Henrique Meirelles, president of

BankBoston, took over as head of
the Central Bank, and Luiz Furlan,
owner and chairman of the board of
Sadia Corporation, a giant Brazilian

frozen foods company, became minister of development, industry and
trade. Lula also enacted a reform of
Brazil's pension plan that put the
country on a much sounder footing
financially. He promised to maintain the agreement that his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso,
had signed with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and his
administration has adhered faithfully
to its guidelines. More specifically
with regard to foreign direct investment (FDI), Lula continued plans

begun during the previous administration for Brazil to create a national-level investment promotion
agency, Investe Brasil.

All of these actions confirmed to
the business community in general,
and to foreign investors in particular, that Lula had thoroughly
changed his views on foreign investment. Brazil was rewarded with an
improvement in its investment grade
from rating agencies such as
Standard and Poor's and Moody's, a
key indicator for prospective

investors of a country's financial stability and overall investment climate.
What caused Lulas views on foreign investment to change so rapid-

ly? The practical realities of being in
government, rather than outside of
it, and Lulas determination to prove
that the PT could be effective at
running the country were important
factors. But the experiences of
Olivio Dutra, who as governor of

the southern state of Rio Grande do
Sul from 1999-2003 was one of the
party's highest elected officials until
Lula took office, also provided lessons for the PT about the benefitsboth political and economic-of
foreign direct investment from
transnational corporations. The
story of Dutra and the PT in Rio
Grande do Sul speaks volumes about
how parties and politicians can learn
from their perceived mistakes.
Setting the Stage: Britto's Efforts
to Attract FDI

Dutra's predecessor as governor of
Rio Grande do Sul, the centrist
Ant6nio Britto (1995-1999), had a
vision of turning Brazil's southernmost state into an attractive location
for manufacturing. It is common
practice for many of Brazil's 26
states to use reductions in their state
sales tax and other incentives to
compete for FDI. Seeking to lure
FDI away from the more prosperous, industrialized and densely populated state of Sao Paulo, Britto
offered generous incentives to persuade large transnational corporations to establish manufacturing
plants in his state. By the time
Britto ran for re-election in 1998,
General Motors and other firms had

Features

Lessons from the PT government
in Rio Grande do Sul
ment program that gave special

incentives to automobile manufacturers locating their plants in Brazil's
northeast.
Another strong point in Bahia's

favor was the fact that Antonio
Carlos Magalhaes, then president of
Brazil's Senate and one of the country's most influential politicians at
the time, was from the state. His
party, the Partido da Frente Liberal
(PFL), was a key partner in President
Cardoso's governing coalition. With

his enormous clout, Magalhaes was
able to persuade Congress to modify

a4

Olivio Dutra,governor of Rio Grande do Sul (1999-2003).

already established major plants in

The Ford Fiasco

Rio Grande do Sul. Ford Motor
Corporation and Dell Computer

renegotiate with Dutra, but to no

had signed contracts with the Britto
government guaranteeing specific
incentives and were preparing to
begin construction on plants of their

own.
To the chagrin of these executives,
Britto lost the election. The winner

was Dutra, the PT candidate and
one of the parry's founders. Dutra
had campaigned in part on a plat-

form to discontinue the incentives
offered to large transnational corporations, including Ford and Dell.
The executives' concerns were justified: Upon taking office, Dutra pro-

ceeded to follow through on his
rhetoric, announcing that he would
rescind Britto's agreements with the
companies.

Executives at Ford attempted to
avail. Standing by his position
regarding the incentives, Dutra

refused even to meet with them.
After several thwarted attempts to
negotiate, the Ford executives gave
up. Since they had not yet begun
construction on the manufacturing
plant planned for the town of
Guaiba, near the state capital of

the legislation on incentives for manufacturing automobiles in the northeast so that Ford could take advantage of it, even though the deadline
for companies to participate had
passed.
The federal government approved
additional incentives to make up for
the extra costs Ford would face by
building its plant in Bahia instead of
the more conveniently located Rio
Grande do Sul. Brazil's national
development bank, Banco Nacional
de Desenvolvimento Econ6mico e
Social (BNDES), offered Ford a lowinterest loan of more than US$300

million after the company
announced it was moving to Bahia.
This was far more than it had
planned to give for Ford's investment

Porto Alegre, they began to consider
alternative locations within Brazil.
The state of Bahia emerged as a

in Rio Grande do Sul.
Too late, Dutra realized that Ford
was about to pull out of Rio Grande

viable alternative. Officials there,
determined to win Ford's investment
for their state in the impoverished
northeastern region of Brazil, offered

do Sul and go to Bahia instead.
Aware of the negative political conse-

Britto administration had promised.

quences that could ensue, he
attempted to negotiate with the Ford
executives. But Ford had already
decided to withdraw from Rio

Another plus was a federal govern-

Grande do Sul, and the company

incentives identical to those the
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soon signed a contract with the
Bahian state government.
Ford's departure was a political disaster for Dutra. Residents of
Guafba, the town where the plant
was to have been located, protested
against the governor. Editorials and
articles in the press attacked Dutra
for his actions. Naturally, Dutra's
political opponents emphasized the
negative impact the lost jobs would
have on Rio Grande do Sul.
Dutra Changes His Stance
Not wanting to lose another major
investment, Dutra took a different
approach when Dell executives
approached him to renegotiate their
incentives package. Britto had
promised Dell generous incentives to
attract its proposed US$108 million
plant: a 75% reduction in the state
income tax for 12 years and a US$17

million loan, to be paid back over 10
years with a five-year grace period.
Facing the loss of these incentives,
Dell considered following Ford's
example and locating its plant elsewhere. Other states were ready and
willing to receive Dell's investment
on highly favorable terms. Despite
these offers, however, and Ford's
failed attempts to renegotiate with
Dutra, local Brazilian executives
working for Dell decided to
approach the governor again.
Dell's director of corporate affairs
in Brazil, Fernando Loureiro, devised
a face-saving strategy for the governor to allow Dell to keep its incentives. When Loureiro and his team
met with the governor, they made
the case that Dell was not a typical
transnational corporation. Personal
computers, the products Dell produced, were beneficial to society,
they argued. Computers allowed use
of the Internet, which provided people of all social strata with access to
information. Thus, Dell's products
would actually help to create a more
egalitarian social structure. Dell's
20
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goals and those of the PT governor
were actually closely aligned,
Loureiro insisted. While it might
make sense not to offer incentives to
companies such as Ford, he continued, Dell was different.
Dutra had already experienced the
ire of the gaucho population firsthand after Ford decided to locate its
plant in Bahia, so political calculations may have influenced his actions
at this point. But whether persuaded
by Loureiro's reasoning, motivated
purely by political factors, or some
mixture of both, Dutra decided to let
Dell keep all of the original incentives the previous governor had
offered with only minor conditions.
Dell stayed. And in many of his
public speeches thereafter, Dutra
used Dell as an example of the sort
of company his government would
like to attract to Rio Grande do Sul.
Despite this new approach, the
Dutra government still had difficulty
luring investment to the state in the
years that followed Ford's departure.
Few transnational corporations were
willing to invest in a state whose governor seemed at the very least to have
an ambivalent attitude toward FDI,
and where the rules regarding foreign
investment could change so quickly.

represent the PT in that race, Tarso
Genro, eventually lost to a relatively
unknown politician from the more
moderate Party of the Brazilian
Democratic Movement (PMDB).
The PT's decline in Rio Grande do
Sul continued in October 2004
when the party lost control of the
capital city, Porto Alegre (home to
the World Social Forum), for the
first time since 1988.

The lessons of Dutra's rapid
decline were discussed widely in the
media, in business and political circles, and especially within the PT
itself. To a certain extent, the state
government of Rio Grande do Sul
had been the PT's showcase at the
sub-national level, a dress rehearsal
for how the party might behave if
and when it finally achieved national
power. A longstanding fear of the
domestic and international business
communities was that a PT national
government would be hostile to foreign investment. This fear was confirmed in Rio Grande do Sul by
Dutra's aggressive and ultimately
counterproductive confrontation
with Ford. Within the PT, the consensus among Lula's advisors was that
if the party were to have a serious
shot at winning the presidential election in 2002, it would have to adopt

The Lessons from Rio Grande

do Sul
The PT could not help but absorb
the painful and well-publicized lessons of Dutra's experience in Rio
Grande do Sul. As governor of a
major state, Dutra held one of the
few major offices the PT had captured up until that time, but his
rigid, ideologically driven stance
toward Ford, and Ford's subsequent
withdrawal of its proposed manufacturing plant from Rio Grande do
Sul, contributed to make him hugely
unpopular. It helped explain why
Dutra lost the internal party primary
to run for re-election in 2002 and

why the candidate finally selected to

a more pragmatic and moderate
stance toward FDI.
Many factors explain Lula's shift to
a more pragmatic approach regarding
foreign investment. But the PT's
experiences in sub-national government are certainly a large part of the
story. Without a doubt, the harsh
lessons that Dutra, and the PT itself,
learned firsthand in Rio Grande do
Sul were among the most important
reasons for this change. U

Roy C. Nelson is associateprofessor of
internationalstudies at Thunderbird,
the Garvin School ofInternational
Management.
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Facing the Past
by James N. Green

Brazil's return to democratic rule has been a
rough roller coaster ride.
Spiraling inflation in the
late 1980s and early 1990s dovetailed with the impeachment of
Fernando Collor, the country's first
directly elected president since 1960.
Two-term President Fernando
Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002) held
down price increases and stepped up

the integration of the Brazilian economy into the global market, but his
popular support waned during his
final years in office. In late 2002,
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva came to the

presidency with widespread backing
from the popular classes and the
enthusiastic expectations of his leftwing political base. His administration, however, has become embroiled
in controversy about the lingering
legacy of the military regime. A

national debate has emerged about
whether the excesses of the military
dictatorship merit further investigation or should be laid to rest. The
outcome may be a test of the extent
to which democracy is firmly rooted
in Brazil.
Solidarity in the States
Few people realize that the concerted campaigns in the United
States to defend human rights in
Latin America over the last three
decades grew in large part out of a
modest effort initiated in the late
1960s by Brazilians seeking international allies to inform the world of
the deteriorating situation in their
country after the military coup of
April 1, 1964. Instrumental in this
effort was a meeting between a small

Archives, torturers and the legacies
of dictatorship
group of Brazilian exiles and William
Wipfler, then assistant director of the
Latin American Department of the

National Council of Churches.
In December 1969, Jether Pereira
Ramalho, a lay leader in the
Brazilian Congregationalist Church,
and his wife, Lucilia, traveled to New
York. Upon arrival, they went
directly to meet Wipfler at an office

building on Riverside Drive, next to
the imposing neo-Gothic church
that dominates the neighborhood.
There they were greeted by Jovelino
Ramos, a Presbyterian minister from

Rio de Janeiro who left Brazil in
1968 after being indicted for alleged
subversive activities. He was accompanied by an old friend, Ruben
Cdsar Fernandes, who had gone into
exile in the mid 1960s and recently
enrolled at Columbia University to
complete his doctorate in history.
Domicio Pereira, a Congregationalist
minister from Rio de Janeiro, was
also present. The warm embraces
and jovial atmosphere so common
when old friends reunite, however,
was undercut by the serious tone of
the occasion. A simple but significant plan was in the making.
Discretely, Ramalho and Pereira
had brought with them to the
United States a collection of documents detailing the fates of hundreds
of Brazilian political prisoners. Item
by item, they turned over the material to Wipfler for his examination.
Many years later, the Episcopal cleric

recalled looking at the denunciations
for the first time: "Several were
scrawled on scraps of filthy paper,
paper bags or wrinkled envelopes,
and were difficult to decipher.
Another was transcribed in minute
lettering on a single square of toilet
paper; reading it required a magnify-

ing glass...I knew things were bad in
Brazil, but I hadn't seen anything in
writing, any texts. [Ramalho and
Pereira] brought with them individual and group testimonies."
Among the material the two had
smuggled out of Brazil was a statement drafted earlier that month by
16 female political prisoners at a
detention center on an island in Rio
de Janeiro harbor. The document
boldly declared: "We have written
this letter from where we are imprisoned on the Ilha das Flores in Rio de
Janeiro. Only now is information
starting to trickie out about the
atrocities that have been committed
against political prisoners in our
country; thus, the Brazilian public
may still doubt that these criminal
acts are really taking place. We can
assure everyone that TORTURE

DOES EXIST IN BRAZIL." The
document then named the 16 female
prisoners and detailed their treatment, describing beatings, electric
shock and other forms of torture.
Shaken by what he had read and
determined to help, Wipfler immediately invited the Brazilians to set up
operations in a vacant office at the
Hemisphere Volume
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WE CANNOT REMAIN SILENT
We cannot remain silent in the face of the overwhelming evidence of the flagrant denial of human
rights and dignity coeing to us from Brazil. This dossier is but a fraction of that evidence. Significantly, several documents were written by Brazllians and smuggled out of grazil at great risk to those
involved. They accepted the possible penalties in order to inform the people of the world of the fact
that terror and torture are used in their country as instruments of government.
We cannot remain silent.
perpetrators of this repression.
test with us.

To do so would make us accomplices of those who are the authors and
We call upon the readers of this dossier to raise their voices is pro-
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public statement, "We Cannot
Remain Silent," that condemned the
Brazilian government's treatment of
political prisoners. In April 1970,
Latin American specialists at the
Second National Conference of the
Latin American Studies Association
(LASA) in Washington, D.C., passed
a stinging resolution condemning
torture in Brazil. Representatives of

the National Council of Churches
and the US Catholic Conference
presented a thick dossier to the
Inter-American Human Rights

Commission of the Organization of
American States in June of that year
requesting that the international
agency conduct an on-site investiga-

tion into human rights abuses. In
December 1971, when General and
President Emilio G. Mddici visited
President Richard Nixon in
Washington, activists organized a

protest in front of the White House.
Reports from Brazil and consistent

campaigning in the United States
influenced strong editorial positions
in the New York Times and the
Washington Post against the Brazilian

generals in power. Brazil was no
longer simply the land of parrots,
Amazonian rain forest and Carnival;
it had also become the land of torture.

National Council of Churches. For
the next two months they organized
the material that Ramalho and
Pereira had brought from Brazil,
indexing the denunciations and
preparing a complete dossier that
could be published in English and
distributed in the United States.
Wipfler also put the group in contact
with Ralph Della Cava, a professor
of Brazilian and Latin American history at Queens College who, along
with American University Professor

Brady Tyson, had been working
behind the scenes in the United
States against the Brazilian dictatorship. Louis M. Colonnese, then

24

Hemisphere Volume

15

director of the US Catholic
Conference's Latin American Bureau,
and his successor, Thomas Quigley,
soon joined these efforts, playing a
leading role in keeping the issue alive
in Washington.
Over the next several years a loosely knit but broad-based network of
clerics, academics, political exiles and
activists carried out a series of campaigns to educate the American public about the serious violation of
human rights in Brazil and the US
government's tacit support for the
military regime. They sought support from leading clergy, academics
and other prominent figures for a

The campaign in the United States
to denounce the repressive measures
of the Brazilian military government
proved to be a valuable experience
for those who took up the cause of
human rights in Chile after the
armed forces of that country, led by
Augusto Pinochet, overthrew the
democratically elected government of
Dr. Salvador Allende in 1973.
Whereas hundreds of concerned
individuals in the United States had
mobilized against human rights violations in Brazil, thousands became
involved in a multitude of campaigns
throughout the country to denounce
the arrest, execution and disappearance of progressive political activists

Features

in Chile. The Watergate scandals
and the widespread questioning of
US foreign policy initiatives in the
wake of the Vietnam War laid the
groundwork for the introduction of
new legislation limiting foreign aid
to countries that violated their citizens' human rights. In 1976, Jimmy
Carter's presidential campaign was
based in part on his call for a new
foreign policy that privileged human
rights over other geopolitical considerations.

Opening the Archives
Parallel to the expansion of the
international human rights movement, efforts toward democratization
gained momentum in Brazil.
Although the promise of civilian rule
took another 10 years to be fulfilled,
government-initiated gestures favoring a loosening of military control
accelerated in 1974 after the opposition party trounced its pro-military
rival in Congressional elections. As
part of the many accords reached to
guarantee a safe exit strategy for the
armed forces and avoid a revanchist
reckoning with Brazil's torturers, the
Brazilian Congress passed an
Amnesty Act in 1979. This bill benefited approximately 4,500 political
prisoners and exiles, but excluded
many leftist activists found guilty of
murder, kidnapping or other violent
acts. It also exempted from criminal
prosecution those involved in the
torture or disappearance of members
of the opposition.
In 1985, only months after a
return to civilian rule, the Brazilian
Catholic Church published an
exhaustive dossier entitled Brasil:
Nunca Mais (Brazil Never Again)
that documented the forms of torture and repression carried out during the 21 years that the generals
were in power. Five years later, a
journalist reported the discovery of
an unmarked mass grave of government opponents. These revelations

sparked public outrage and renewed
pressure to hold the military
accountable for the crimes of the
recent past. Brazilian human rights
groups, including the Commission
of Relatives of the Dead and the
Disappeared, pressed the government
to conduct further investigations into
the final fate of many activists who
had died or disappeared over the previous two decades. During the
Cardoso administration, the 1995
Law of the Disappeared authorized a
special commission to investigate
these deaths. The Commission's
report documented the torture and
murder of hundreds of activists, but
the 1979 Amnesty Law precluded
prosecution for human rights abuses.
At the same time, state governments
began to declassify and open to the
public millions of political police
files that contained extensive information about the national security
methods employed during the military regime. Researchers who have
consulted these political police
records remain acutely aware that
many other archives of the different
government agencies involved in
repressive measures have remained
sealed.
In late 2004, 30 years after

Brazilian journalist Vladimir Herzog
died in military custody, a military
intelligence agent leaked a pair of
previously unknown photographs
alleged to have been taken only
hours before Herzog supposedly
hanged himself. The journalist's
death in 1975 had sparked unprecedented protests and contributed to
strengthening the movement against
the military regime. The agent who
supplied the photographs claimed
that the armed forces continued
secretly to spy on left-wing activists,
unions and other social movements
for many years after the military
relinquished power in 1985.
Representatives of the armed forces
insisted that files from the years of

political repression had been duly
destroyed in the 1980s, yet in
January 2005 more documents, sup-

posedly burned years ago, reappeared.
Nongovernmental organizations

such as Tortura, Nunca Mais
(Torture Never Again) are demanding that all of the archives of the different intelligence agencies of the
armed forces be turned over to the
National Archive or another public
entity so that friends and relatives
can finally learn the truth about the
whereabouts of the disappeared.
Scholars working on the period of
the military dictatorship stress that
without full access to the armed
forces' archives an exhaustive analysis
of the country's recent history will be
impossible. The Brazilian Historical
Association has gone on record
protesting an executive order issued
in late 2002 extending the classification of many official documents for
an additional 30 to 50 years. The
Lula administration, which contains
many individuals who were victims
of repression between 1964 and
1985, has pledged its commitment
to uncovering the hidden secrets of
the military regime. Whether it will
have the political will to confront the
armed forces in this matter remains
to be seen.

James N. Green is associate professor
ofBrazilian history and culture at
Brown University and chair of the
Committee on the Future of Brazilian
Studies in the United States. He is
currently completing a book entitled
"'We Cannot Remain Silent:'
Opposition to the Brazilian Military
Dictatorship in the United States,

1964-85."
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Learning with Brazil and Lula
by Tanya Dawkins

N

of South Africa's
ot
since Mandela
the election
Nelson
and
Poland's Lech Walesa
has a new leader
generated such interest, hope and
expectation as Brazilian President
Luiz Inicio "Lula" da Silva. In

2003, the newly elected Lula electrified the overflow crowd in Porto
Alegre at his first World Social
Forum address. His victory seemed
to be a concrete affirmation of the
forum's mantra, "Another World is

Possible." That was then. At the
2005 World Social Forum, new
parties, including the Party of
Socialism and Liberty (P-SOL),
founded by dissidents from Lula's
Workers' Party (PT) in 2004, sponsored loud protests just outside
Porto Alegre's Gigantinho Stadium.

Hecklers inside couldn't drown out
the largely supportive crowd, but
the joy, tears, hope and adoration
that washed over the 2003 audience
was replaced by the bated breath of
supporters who seemed to have
come to hear Lula say something,
anything that would make it all
make sense.
The Politics: Is Compromise the
"Gift" that Keeps on Giving?
Candidates are prone to speak in
superlatives, and Lula was no
exception. To the markets he
promised macroeconomic stability
and spectacular growth; to Brazil's
working class and unemployed he
promised 10 million jobs and double the minimum wage in four
years; and to the landless he promised "more land than they could
occupy." He courageously
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acknowledged Brazil's need for
racial justice.
The PT's campaign decision to
gain power by moving toward the
political center has led to an avalanche of compromises that have
tested the party's unity and capacity
to move its agenda forward. Lula's
early decision to maintain the economic team and many of the economic policies of his predecessor,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was

an immediate source of contradiction and controversy. Brazil's interest rates are among the highest in
the world and the country's primary surplus exceeds International
Monetary Fund (IMF) requirements. The tight monetary policies
of Economics Minister Ant6nio
Palocci and Central Bank President

Henrique Meirelles may have won
the hearts and minds of investors,
but advocates for domestic social
and economic investments are calling for their replacement.
The PT's enviably progressive
record of governance at the subnational level has not translated easily
to the federal level. In a cruel
irony, the PT lost two strategic and
symbolic elections in 2004: in
Porto Alegre, known around the
world for pioneering participatory

budgeting and hosting the World
Social Forum, and in Sao Paulo,
the industrial capital and South
America's largest city.
Since 2003, Lula's personal
approval ratings have remained
consistently high. Yet the PT does
not have a majority in either chamber of Congress. Each legislative
initiative requires major negotiation
and alliance building. The opposi-

tion Social Democratic Party

(PSDB), for example, is a likely ally
for social security reform but not
necessarily for progressive land
reform. Growing fissures between
Lula's supporters and groups frus-

trated with the pace of change
recently cost the PT the leadership
of the Chamber of Deputies. In
February 2005, this pivotal seat,

which determines which bills reach
the floor for debate and when, went
to a conservative former supporter

of the 1964-1985 military regime,
Severino Cavalcanti. For the first
time, emerging schisms within the
PT led to a major political defeat.
The Geopolitics: Brazil's Star
Shines on the World Stage
Lula, along with his tireless foreign minister, Celso Amorim, has
revitalized Brazil's presence in the
international arena. Rubens
Barbosa, Brazil's former ambassador
to the US, points to the breadth
and sophistication of Brazil's global
agenda-reinvigorating MERCO-

SUR; shepherding the South
American Community of Nations;
forging economic ties with India,
China, Russia, South Africa and the
Middle East; and, in general,
increasing the Brazilian presence in
the world. In two years, Brazil's
trade deficit has become a US$32
billion surplus, including an 80%
(US$4.5 billion) increase with
China. Cecilia Alemany from the
Association of Latin American

Development Organizations
(ALOP) credits Lula with redefin-

ing the very concept of Latin
America by focusing on building
South America's strength and
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The politics and geopolitics of social
and economic justice
Another world is possible. Every region, country and community struggles with Brazil's
questions within its own unique political and
historical context. It is oddly fitting that
Brazil should be on the leading edge of what it
means to get from here to there.
capacity as a region. The G20, a
Brazilian-led South-South alliance
that includes India, China,

ment initiative at the international
level.

Argentina and South Africa,

Complexity and Contradictions
Yet for all the diplomatic and
economic dividends, the domestic
social agenda is languishing.
Unemployment remains high.
Flagship programs such as Zero

brought the September 2003 World
Trade Organization (WTO) talks to
a standstill over the issue of agricultural subsidies. Nine months later,
at the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) meeting, Brazil hosted the
negotiating session that broke the
impasse.

"Sometimes, I don't think
Brazilians fully appreciate how
Brazil's leadership is changing the
world," says Hazel Henderson,
author of Building a Win-Win
World: Life Beyond Global Economic
Warfare. Henderson cites numer-

ous examples, including the fact
that 600 of the 2000 corporate sig-

natories to the United Nations
Global Compact are Brazilian.
Judy Morrison, director of the
Washington-based Inter-American
Consultation on Race, points to

Brazil's sponsorship of the InterAmerican Commission on Human
Rights' Special Rapporteurship on
People of African Descent in the
Americas as a pioneering govern-

Hunger (Fome Zero) and the Family

Grant (Bolsa Familia) have been
plagued by slow startups, inadequate funding and poor management.

Sociologist and Lula critic James
Petras recently wrote a scathing
essay entitled, "Brazil: Deepening
and Extending NeoLiberalism Year Two." Petras contends that
exponential increases in soybean
and meat exports fuel rain forest
deforestation while resources for
environmental protection are
declining. "This strategy locks
Brazil into a new cycle of dependence on raw material production,
further distorting development patterns," he writes. In a rebuttal,
Lula ally and AFL-CIO Americas

Program Director Stan Gacek contends that such critiques are unfair,
premature, and miss what he calls

the "left-wing of the possible."
Gacek points to Lula's success in
advancing public interest industrial
policy, foreign policy and trade in
"distinct opposition to the undis-

puted hegemony of the North and
its multinational interests." He also
praises unprecedented levels of public participation in Brazilian political life.
"Yes, there is more participation,
but...," says Iara Pietricovsky,
director of the Center for
Socioeconomic Studies (INESC) in

Brasilia, who notes that the real
work is linking increased participation with accountability and
realigning economic policy and
spending. Commissions and con-

sultative processes abound, but
financial resources for education,
health, housing and land reform are
in much shorter supply. Groups
like INESC and Inter-Redes, a
coalition of 42 Brazilian networks
representing indigenous and landless groups, Brazilians of African
descent, environmental and human
rights associations, see democratizing the budget-making process as a

key political and organizing strategy
for shifting priorities and are pressing for a number of reforms,
including making the budget
process electronically accessible to
the public.
Race and Land: Heavy Lifting
Brazil's stunningly unequal land

distribution is an enduring symbol
of its historical inability to grapple
with inequality. One percent of
Brazil's population controls 50% of
its land. Stung by the slow pace of
land settlements and growing vioHemisphere Volume 15
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lence against land rights activists,
groups like the Landless Rural
Workers Movement (MST) that
supported Lula's election are turning up the heat. Rather than break
with the government, they have
carved out a policy called apoio
critico (critical support). Critical
support keeps the channels of communication open but sets the stage
for stepped-up land occupations,
direct action and other measures of
external pressure.
Like land reform, Brazil's racial
inequality remains a major challenge. Lula's government has raised
the profile of issues of race and
social inclusion by creating the
Special Secretariat for the
Promotion of Racial Equality (SEPPIR) to coordinate race-conscious
policies across government; launching Diversidade,a national public
awareness campaign; and beginning
efforts to diversify Brazil's elite
diplomatic corps. But Dr. Silvio
Cunha, economist and co-founder
of the Instituto Cultural Steve Biko
in Salvador, points out that,
"Legislative initiatives such as Law

10639-which promotes affirmative action in higher education and
the teaching of African and AfroBrazilian history in schools-are
undoubtedly important, "but the
passage of stalled measures like the
Statute of Racial Equality is needed
to consolidate policies that advance
the interests of Brazil's majority
Afro-descendant population and
deal with racism at a structural
level."
Learning with Lula
Lula's cautious overtures to capital markets and his progressive
base's learning curve about its new
role as friend of the presidenthas
cost precious momentum and
sowed the seeds of cynicism and
disappointment. "I cannot accept
the permanence of everything I
28
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condemned throughout my entire
life," explains PT militant and historian Sergio Lamario. "People say

that Lula's mandate is the third
term of Fernando Henrique
Cardoso. Unfortunately, I have to
agree with them." Others think it
is too early to give up on Lula.

"What will happen has yet to be
decided," cautions Eduardo
Siqueira, a Brazilian scholar and
activist at the University of
Massachusetts-Lowell who advocates a posture of "support with
struggle."
Lesson #1: Models and Multipliers
Matter. Whether Lula's early economic decisions were necessary
evils or just evils remains the subject of debate. By privileging
export growth and foreign investment over domestic social and economic reforms, however, he has
deepened the very model he campaigned against. "Good economic
policy must generate something
more than money for corporations," notes Dr. Luiza Bairros,

director of the Race and
Democracy Project at the Federal
University of Bahia and former
leader of Brazil's United Black
Movement.
Lula's current economic model
rests on the risky assumption that
growth will create the domestic
political will to distribute gains
more equitably. This will not happen if traditional power relations
remain unchanged. For example, if
feeding the hungry is not accompanied by a strategy that targets the
structural roots of hunger-i.e.
access to land, capital, productive
capacity-the poor will remain at
the mercy of a model incapable of
prioritizing their interests.
Lesson #2: Inequality Matters.
These disconnects act as powerful
multipliers in the reproduction of
poverty and inequality. Brazil's new
growth in exports and GDP has

yet to show signs of bridging the
country's deep structural inequalities. New incentives and indicators
that assess all areas of economic
activity in terms of their contribution to addressing inequality are
needed to make participafdomeaningful.
Lesson #3: Movements Matter.

Twenty years after the military
withdrew from power, Brazilians
realize that political democracy is
not economic democracy. Not
even a leader with Lula's credentials
can create and sustain the conditions needed to advance an aggressive agenda for change. Organized
communities, movements and a
dynamic civil society ultimately
provide the accountability and
political space needed to advance
change at multiple levels. The
tremendous resources expended
during national elections often
come at the expense of local organizing and base-building work. This
model leaves far too much to the
winner's popularity or personal
charisma. The MST, Black
Movement and others are raising
the stakes in the hope that
increased organization, mobilization and pressure will give Lula the
impetus for an aggressive push in
the remaining two years of his
administration and put Brazil's next
president (whether Lula or not) on
notice. In May 2005, the MST
stepped up its campaign with a 17day, 150-mile march on Brasilia.
Twelve thousand small farmers, landless rural workers, and their allies
retraced the steps of a previous march
to demand the implementation of
the National Plan for Land Reform
(PNRA). Leaders of Brazil's Black
Movement have reportedly been discussing a similar mobilization.
Lesson #4: Tough Love Matters.
The struggle over the social and
economic justice agenda in Brazil is
often a fight between "friends."
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Lula's allies are realizing the need
for a new set of skills to win recognition from the government. The
MST's "Critical Support" policy is
just one of many emerging terms of
engagement. The US civil rights
movement and South Africa's antiapartheid movement lost critical
momentum during similar
moments. The art and science of
movement-state relations when a
leader with progressive credentials is
in office is still unfolding.
Lesson #5: Ideas Matter. Five
years ago, Brazil gave birth to the
first World Social Forum. In that
short time, the annual event has
grown from 5000 to 175,000 participants. The World Social Forum
is the intellectual touchstone of a
new generation of analysts,
activists, NGOs, and progressive
business and movement leaders
who are reclaiming the market,
redefining democracy and rejecting

labels like "protectionist." Proposals
range from new strategies for guaranteeing access to health care and
capital to maintaining citizen control over natural resources and harnessing international currency speculation to fund health and economic development. "New ideas need
10 to 15 years to take hold. This
new tide of citizen mobilization
round the world is less than 10
years old," notes Candido
Grzybowski, director of the
Brazilian Institute for Social and
Economic Analysis (IBASE) and a
member of the World Social Forum
Organizing Committee.
Another world is possible. Every
region, country and community
struggles with Brazil's questions
within its own unique political and
historical context. It is oddly fitting that Brazil should be on the
leading edge of what it means to
get from here to there. For all its

COMING

contradictions and complexities,
the political space that has opened
because of Brazil's leadership and
movements is enviable and impressive. One of Brazil's many gifts to
the world may very well be lessons
that inform and transform the politics and geopolitics of social and
economic justice. U

Tanya Dawkins (dawkinst@
mindspring.com) is thefounder/
directorof the Inter-AmericanForum
and senior vice presidentof the
Collins Centerfor Public Policy.
The Forum is a leadership andpolicy
project working to develop, highlight
andpromote new visions of trade and
economic policy thatplace social equity, public interestand community at
the center of the public andpolicy
agenda.
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FIU Report on "Terrorism Preparedness in Florida"
Dr. Michael W. Collier, Lead Investigator
This two-year field research project by Florida International University's Latin American and Caribbean Center
and Institute for the Study of Transnational Crime and Terrorism investigates the readiness of Florida's first
responders to handle a terrorist attack. Included are an assessment of the security posture of Florida's critical
infrastructure and a statewide telephone poll of Florida citizens about terrorism preparedness issues.
While Florida is often seen as a national leader in emergency readiness programs and is better prepared than
before the 9/11 disasters, the state is far from ready to respond to future attacks. The citizens surveyed for this
project strongly supported terrorism preparedness programs, indicating they would give up more civil liberties
and pay higher taxes to ensure the safety of their families.
To order an advance copy, call the Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University,
(305) 348-2894, or email Michael Collier at: collierm@fiu.edu.
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Drought and Hope in the Sertao
Photos and text by Ricardo Funari

T

of Brazil known as the

he northeastern
region
sertdo
is synonymous

with drought and
poverty for most
Brazilians. In fact, however, its average annual rainfall is twice that of
productive areas in Arizona and New

Mexico. An underground sea of
fresh water waits to be tappedsome 4,300 cubic meters of water
per inhabitant. (The United Nations
estimates the region's minimum need
as 2,000 cubic meters per inhabitant.) Huge amounts of water are

also stored in reservoirs.
The technical know-how for channeling and distributing all this water
has been around for decades, and the
financial means to tackle the problem have always existed. What is
lacking is political will to solve the
problem, an impasse has kept the socalled drought industry thriving.
Against a background of artificial
scarcity, a few powerful individuals
profit from the poverty of the majority, with paternalism a dominant cultural trait. Illiteracy levels are high in
the sertdo, short-term job prospects
are nil for the overwhelming majority of the rural population and malnutrition is beginning to spread.

The sertdo is the most populous
semi-arid region in the world. Some
10 million people live in a rural area
that includes 1,209 municipalities in
nine states. To date, no government
has ever taken effective measures
against this historic tragedy, even
though severe droughts strike the
region every 12 to 15 years-the last
one was in 1998-1999-and moderate drought conditions are nearly
always a problem. Scientists recently
30
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correlated these cycles with El Nino,
which typically causes floods in the
south of the country and fires in the
north.
A project that would substantially
alleviate the effects of drought in the
northeast has been gathering dust in
the drawers of Brazil's federal government for more than a decade: divert-

and refugees from northeastern
regions historically scourged by
drought. People from these areas
also account for a large percentage of
residents in the favelas (shantytowns)
of Rio de Janeiro and So Paulo.
Formal employment simply does
not exist in the rural areas of the

ing the So Francisco River, an idea

on small plots of cleared land.
Without water, there can be no crop,
no income, or anything to eat. This
is the ground where the age-old
plague of slavery flourishes and
spreads in its modern forms, creating
an army of cheap, unskilled laborers
to serve the economic system.
People who have no other options
will work in exchange for food or
ridiculously low wages if their only
alternative is to go hungry. U

that traces back to the beginning of
last century and that has re-emerged
with every drought in the area. The
diversion would create a man-made
channel to bring water to 2,100 kilo-

meters of dried-up riverbeds. At
least six million inhabitants would
benefit from the water supply, and
the project would create 1.2 million
direct and indirect jobs on 333,000

newly irrigated hectares of land.

sertdo. People try to make a living

With adequate water supplies, agro-

industry could change the profile of
the whole region. The media recently
began publicizing the project and the

Lula administration is consulting
ecologists in an attempt to revive it.
Drought is not a problem confined to the northeastern part of the
country. Its human effects spill over
to the rest of Brazilian society. Since
1991, I have been researching what I
call "modern forms of slavery" in
Brazil. I haven't found people in
shackles or public floggings; the
methods used to enslave human
beings today are more sophisticated,
and therefore more difficult to detect
and fight. Modern-day slaves work
as day laborers, sugar cane cutters,
rubber gatherers, charcoal burners
and farm hands conned into corrupt
labor relations that imply slavery
through debt. The overwhelming
majority of the workers are migrants

Ricardo Funariis a photojournalistin
Brazil. He directs SocialPhotos,
a cooperative ofphotographersthat
creates and distributes images documenting and addressingissues of social
justice. More examples ofhis work can
be viewed at www.photobrazil com
and www.socialphotos.com.

Opposite, top: Soledade, Paraiba.
A girl plays in a dry dam used
nowadays as a soccer field.
Opposite, bottom: Barra de Santa
Rosa, Paraiba. In drought conditions, residents must walk up to
several miles for clean water, carrying heavy buckets back home.

ti
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Barra de Santa Rosa, Paraiba. Refugees from drought and poverty in the sertdo pass a grave beside the road.

Soledade, Paraiba.A municipal
clerk supervisespeople waiting in
line for waterfrom a desalinator.
Eachfamily is allotted two buckets of clean water every other day.
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Soledade, Paraiba. Food is in short supplyfor many ruralfamilies.

Brejinho, Pernambuco.
A volunteer agent of the NGO

Pastoral da Crianfa monitors
children's weight with a scale to
check for infant malnutrition.
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Santa Cruz da Baixa Verde, Pernambuco. The Catholic Church distributes basic goods to rural residents
affected by drought.

Juazeiro do Norte, Ceard.
The faithful crowd an outdoor

Opposite: Afogados da Ingazeira,
Pernambuco. Rural residents of
the sertdo receive only sporadic
medical care, relying on their
Catholicfaith instead. On the
wall are pictures of Padre Cicero
and Frei Damido, revered clergy-

i
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men who ministeredto the rural
northeast.
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Bananeiras, Paraiba.A 72-year-old man embraces his six-year-old son.

Pernambuco. Like many others
before them, afamily of rural
migrantsfrom the sertdo tries to
hitch a ride to Sdo Paulo, South
America's largest city. President

Lula made a similar trip with his
mother and six siblings in 1952,
when he was seven years old. The
family traveled on the back of a
truckfrom Garanhuns,
Pernambuco, to Sdo Paulo. The
trip took 13 days.
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SocialPho

os

documentary photography advocating change

J.R. Ripper/SocialPhotos

SocialPhotos is a cooperative of photographers
that works to create and distribute images documenting and addressing issues of social justice. We
actively strive to build collaborative relationships with
progressive organizations engaged in work on the
issues we cover, in order to encourage the most
effective, constructive use of our photos.
Online photo catalog at:
http://www.socialphotos.com/
There you will find: human rights, exploitation & modern slavery, Third World-related subjects, poverty &
hunger, housing & health, children in risky situations,
women's issues, social work, religion, environmental
degradation, minorities...
And also those same people laughing, playing,
loving, dancing, sharing, giving a hand, dreaming...

SocialPholos.com by Ricardo funari Tel. +55-21-22650974 -[mail socialphotos@socialphoos.com -Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
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US-Brazilian Relations
by Donna J. Hrinak

The United States and Brazih A
Long Road of Unmet Expectations
By Monica Hirst; conclusion by
Andrew Hurrell. London, New

York: Routledge, 2004, 160 pages.
$75 hardcover; $18.95 paperback.
The US-Brazil relationship is so
complex and so different from US
relations with the countries of
Hispanic America that, even

among hemispheric policy makers,
few in the United States understand it. When other countries of
the region looked to the United
States for leadership, Brazil sought
partnership. When others looked
northward for direction, Brazil
looked inward. US insensitivity to
the differences Brazil cherishes,
combined with Brazil's insistence
that it owes the US no explanations, have for too many years left
each side believing the other has
acted unreasonably, capriciously or
simply from a desire to provoke.
As this book notes, the result has
been "unmet expectations" in both
countries.

By discussing the contemporary
bilateral relationship in historical
context and examining some of the
factors shaping it today, Monica
Hirst does an admirable job of
describing what makes US relations
with Brazil different from those
with other countries in the region,
explaining the complexities of
alliance between two of what
George Kennan has termed the
world's five "monster" countries.
But Hirst's task, complicated from

the start, is made more difficult by
the format of the series of which it
forms a part.
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According to the producers of
Routledge's series on Contemporary
Inter-American Relations, the books
are deliberately short, in part to
encourage further study. That
approach worked well in the one
other book in the set with which I
am familiar, The UnitedStates and
Venezuela, by Carlos Romero and
the late Janet Kelly. But in the case
of Brazil, brevity confines the
author to raising topics rather than
examining them in depth. Chapter
Three's discussion of Brazilian and
US voting patterns in the United
Nations, for example, would have
benefited from an explanation that
differences often stem from longheld Brazilian foreign policy tenets,
such as an unwillingness to approve
single-country human rights resolutions. I kept feeling that Hirst
wanted to say more but was running out of space. More information on certain points in the first
part of the book also would have
given Andrew Hurrell's conclusion a
stronger foundation.
Still, when issues are relatively
unexplored, as are many of those
which Hirst presents, even a mention can be worthwhile and positive.
This is particularly true of two topics she raises at the end of Chapter
Three: 1) Brazilian immigration to
the United States, and 2) public
perceptions of the other in each
country.
Many immigrant populations

have influenced relations between
their native country and the United
States. Mexico comes to mind first,
of course, as well as the Dominican
Republic and, recently, Venezuela.
Few Americans are aware of the

growing Brazilian population in the

US, but its development is well
worth watching, perhaps even for
the day when the US Congressional
Hispanic Caucus has to change its
name to accommodate a new
Brazilian-American member.
Hirst only briefly mentions the
flip side of the new Brazilian presence in the United States: growing
US investment in Brazil. This
investment comes not from Silicon
Valley or the Fortune 500, but from
hundreds and thousands of Midwest
farmers who are forming cooperatives to buy land in Brazil. Their
potential to influence decisions on
agricultural issues in particular is
similarly worth following. Cases
like the recent anti-dumping charges
brought in the US against Brazilian
shrimp, for instance, could be handled quite differently in the future
as the number of US citizens with
shrimp farms in Brazil increases.
As for public opinion, Hirst correctly notes that much work
remains to be done on both sides if
Brazilians and Americans are to
develop a more complete and balanced understanding of each others'
culture and world view. Expanding
the current modest level of exchange
programs and targeting more public
affairs resources to work with young
people should be a priority for both
countries. Under Ambassador
Rubens Barbosa, the Brazilian
Embassy in Washington began a
major school outreach program, but
other options, such as creating a
Brazilian version of the US
International Visitors program for
young professionals, remain unexplored.

Review Forum

Development Minister Sergio
Amaral, former Defense Minister

Jose Viegas, and former Science and
Technology Minister Ronaldo
Sardenberg. Brazil's relatively under-

developed civil service system generally means that Itamaraty career
functionaries are the most prepared
to assume positions throughout the
government, and their presence in
all key agencies has allowed them to
spread the Foreign Ministry's world
view in all administrations.
Nevertheless, Hirst reports chal-

lenges to Itamaraty's dominance
from other ministries that share
growing responsibility for foreign
affairs, particularly foreign economic

issues. Another area worthy of
broader discussion, therefore, is the
potential influence on US-Brazil
relations of the increasingly louder

voices of these new actors.
In addition to its limited space for
discussion, another of this book's
flaws is the inclusion of certain
minor but significant factual errors.
According to Hirst, for example, the
US "praised the Brazilian govern-

ment for its... military air interception program" to fight narcotics trafficking. In fact, the Brazilian shoot-

down law (Lei do Abate) is a prime
example of the various misunderstandings at play in the bilateral relationship. Brazil expected the US to
be pleased with this signal of its clear
intent to fight traffickers, but the
new regulations ran afoul of a US

law-passed after the tragic down-

Another important and controversial issue Hirst takes on at several

points in the book is the dominant
role of Itamaraty, the Brazilian
Foreign Ministry, in foreign policy

making. Itamaraty "remains the
main state agency" on trade issues,
she notes, while the State
Department doesn't even figure
among the three US government

agencies responsible for economic
relations with Latin America.
US diplomats can only envy
Itamaraty's role. Members of the
Brazilian Foreign Service act as
international affairs advisors to other
cabinet members and can themselves
aspire to cabinet posts outside the
Foreign Ministry. This was the path

followed by former Industry and

ing in Peru of a plane with US missionaries on board-prohibiting
assistance to countries whose laws
place civilian aircraft at risk.
Because of US concerns, Brazil waited until 2004 to implement the law,
five years after its passage and after

many domestic complaints about
US infringement of the nation's sovereignty.
Hirst also cites a Brazilian
Embassy report claiming that US
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tariffs on Brazil's top exports averaged 45.6%, in contrast to Brazil's
14.3% average tariff on leading
exports from the US. While technically correct, this calculation is
misleading. It includes the 350%
tariff imposed on tobacco imported
from Brazil above the quota set for
this commodity, but in fact that
tariff has never been imposed
because Brazil has never come even
close to filling its quota. It is this
type of simplistic information
about complex subjects that irritates the US and embitters the
atmosphere of already difficult
bilateral trade talks.
The transition from the four
chapters written by Hirst to the
concluding essay by Andrew
Hurrell is less than smooth, but
Hurrell makes an important contribution by considering US-Brazil
relations in a global context.
Perhaps most useful is his examination of Brazil's uncertainty about its
place in the world; in particular, its
unwillingness to accept the responsibilities of leadership while clamoring for respect. Also thoughtful is
his point that while Brazil and the

US may share important valuessupport for democracy, for example-they differ seriously over how
to promote those values and which
elements to prioritize. The discussion helps readers understand the
static in a relationship between two
countries whose core values coincide.
Hurrell also reinforces one of
Hirst's essential points, about the
link between Brazil's foreign and
development policies. Business and
commercial interests are essential
components of Brazil's modern foreign policy, but economic development has never been an important
factor in US global affairs. The US
largely fails to recognize the importance Brazil places on the link
between its development and events
in the rest of the world. By emphasizing and explaining this link,
Hirst and Hurrell make an important contribution to US understanding of Brazilian identity.
A more complete view of USBrazilian relations requires substantially more discussion than this
book offers, but to the extent Hirst
and Hurell raise questions and a

desire for further knowledge they
will have succeeded in advancing
the "mature partnership" the two
countries deserve. The directors of
the project on Contemporary InterAmerican Relations deserve praise
for including this essential topic in
this series.
Finally, it's worth repeating the
quote Hirst includes by former
Brazilian Foreign Minister Juracy
Magalhaes, who in 1966 famously
declared, "What's good for the
United States is also good for
Brazil." That may not always be
true; however, what's good for the
US can also be good for Brazil, and
vice versa. By recognizing the complexities in our relationship, we can
more successfully identify where
our common interests lie and work
more collaboratively to promote
them.
DonnaJ. Hrinak is the former US
ambassadorto Brazil. She is currently co-chair of the InternationalTrade,
Competition and Government
Practiceat Steel, Hector & Davis
LLP in Miami.

6TH CONFERENCE ON CUBAN AND CUBAN-AMERICAN STUDIES
presented by the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University
October 27-29, 2005
The Cuban Research Institute continues the tradition of convening scholars
engaged in the study of Cuba and Cuban-Americans by presenting its 6th Conference.
The theme of this year's conference is "Politics and Culture.'
For further information about the conference and other CRI activities,
please see our website at http://lacc.fiu.edu/cri/ or contact us at:
Cuban Research Institute
Florida International University
DM 363, University Park, Miami, FL 33199 * (305) 348-1991/crinst@fiu.edu
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Political Corruption in the
Caribbean Basin
Constructing a Theory to Combat Corruption
by Michael W. Collier
Latin American and Caribbean Center
Florida International University

Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin retards state economic growth and development, undermines
government legitimacy, and threatens state security. In spite of recent anti-corruption efforts of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, Caribbean political corruption problems appear to be
worsening in the post-Cold War period. This work discovers why efforts to arrest corruption are failing
by investigating the domestic and international causes of political corruption in the Caribbean.
The study's theoretical framework centers on an interdisciplinary model of political corruption built within the rule-oriented constructivist approach to social science. The analysis first employs a rational choice
analysis that broadly explains differing levels of state corruption. The constructivist theory of social rules
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Lula and the Workers' Party

On

by Marian Goslinga

October 27, 2002,

the Brazilian people
elected Luiz Inicio
Lula da Silva, the
leader of the

Workers' Party (PT) and a former

metalworker, to the presidency with
61% of the popular vote. This
unusual result was partly a reflection of a gradual shift within the
Brazilian labor movement from
radical socialism as a political
objective to more pragmatic political and economic strategies.
This bibliography, drawing upon
diverse sources, sheds light on conditions in today's Brazil, with an
emphasis on selections about Lula
and the Workers' Party. The main
focus of most of the entries is economic, reflecting both the main
challenge Lula faces and the top
preoccupation of analysts concerned about Brazil's economic
future under his left-leaning administration.

In addition to the more recent
titles listed below, two older but
informative books on the formation
and early experiences of the PT are
Rachel Meneguello, A formacdo de
um partido, 1979-1982 (Rio de
Janeiro: Editora Paz e Terra, 1989)
and Margaret Keck, The Workers'
Party and Democratization in Brazil
(New Haven: Yale University Press,

Almeida, Thomas. The Brazilian
Economy and President Lula [video
recording]. 2003. 1 videocassette
Alves, Brito. A histdria de Lula: o

operdrio presidente. Rio de Janeiro:
Espago e Tempo, 2003. 191 pp.
(Published in 2004 in Spanish as La
historiade Lula: de obrero a presidente
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Carvalhal, Eugenio do. "Os negociadores de Lula." Conjuntura
Economica,v. 57, no. 2 (February

Colombia.)

2003): 40-43.

Aragdo, Murillo de. "Lula at the
Halfway Point." LatinFinance

Carvalho, Fernando J. Cardim de,
and Fernando Ferrari Filho. "El
presidente Lula da Silva en el
primer tercio de su mandato."
Investigacidn Econdmica, v. 63, no.
249 (July/September 2004): 55-74.
(Analyzes Lula's economic policies
after the first third of his term, focus-

(September 2004): 38-41.
Bacha, Edmar Lisboa. "Elementos
para uma economia politica das
reformas no governo Lula." Revista

de Economia Politica (Brazil), v. 24,
no. 1 (January-March 2004): 17-28.
Baiocchi, Gianpaolo, ed. Radicals
in Power: The Workers'Party (P)
and Experiments in Urban
Democracy in Brazil New York,
NY: Zed Books (distributed by
Palgrave), 2003. 254 pp.
Betto, Frei. "Dilemas da politica
economica." CarosAmigos, v. 8, no.

95 (February 2005): 6-12.
.

"Lula: detalhes biografi-

cos," Caros Amigos, v. 6, no. 67
(October 2002): 26-27.
. "O significado da vitoria
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and Hilary Wainwright. Lula and
the Workers' Party in Brazil. New
York, NY: New Press, 2003. 144 pp.
(Originally published under the title
Politics Transformed.)

by Editorial Oveja Negra, Bogota,

1992).
Almeida, Paulo Roberto de. "La
politica externa del nuevo gobierno del Presidente Luiz Inicio Lula
da Silva: retrospectiva historica y
evaluacion pragmitica." Revista
EspacioAcademico, v. 2, no. 19
(December 2002): 19-37.

Branford, Sue, Bernardo Kucinski,

de Lula para a esquerda: a estrela
sobe." Caros Amigos, v. 6, no. 69
(December 2002): 18-20.

ing on policy strategies.)

Cavalcanti, Luiz Otivio. O que d

o

governo Lula. Sao Paulo: Landy

Editora, 2003. 77 pp.
Coggiola, Osvaldo. Governo Lula:
da esperanfa a realidade. Sio
Paulo: Xamd, 2004. 181 pp.
Coligagio Lula Presidente. Programa
de governo 2002: um Brasilpara

todos. Sdo Paulo: Comitd Lula
Presidente, 2002. 88 pp.
Corazza, Gentil, and Fernando
Ferrari Filho. "A politica economica
do governo Lula no primeiro ano

de mandato: perplexidades, dilemas, resultados e alternativas."
IndicadoresEconomicos FEE,v. 32,

no. 1 (May 2004): 243-251.

Publications Update

Dathein, Ricardo. "Governo Lula:
uma alternativa de politica
economica para evitar seu fracasso
e atingir o desenvolvimento con
estabilidade de preeos." Indicadores
Econamicos FEE,v. 31, no. 4
(February 2004): 229-258.
Diaz, Leonardo. Lula. Barcelona,

Spain: Ediciones de la Tempestad,
2004. 124 pp.
. "O que o Brasil pode
esperar do governo Lula."
ConjunturaEconomica, v. 57, no. 2
(February 2003): 24-26.

Godio, Julio, ed. Un PT en
Argentina? Reformular las formas
de pensar la politica para entender
la experiencia brasilenia. Buenos
Aires: Corregidor, 2003.

Gratius, Susanne. "La politica exterior de Lula: ma's cambio que continuidad." Iberoamericana
(Germany), v. 4, Nueva epoca, no.13
(March 2004): 175-181.
Hakim, Peter. "The Reluctant
Partner." Foreign Affairs, v. 83, no.
1 (January/February 2004): 114-

Figueira Leal, Paulo Roberto. O PT

e o dilema da representafdo politica. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da
Fundagio Getulio Vargas, 2005.
128 pp.
Furuguem, Alberto. "Para onde

Morrison, John. Luiz Indcio Lula
da Silva. Philadelphia, PA: Chelsea
House, 2004. 96 pp.
Nascimento, Joio. Lula: do agreste

ao planalto, 1945-2003. Lisboa:
Editorial Noticias, 2003. 138 pp.

123. (Suggestions for improving

US-Brazil relations.)
Fausto Neto, Antonio, Eliseo Ver6n,
and Antonio Albino Rubim. Lula
presidente: televisdo e politica na
campanha eleitoral Sao Paulo:
Hacker, 2003. 174 pp.

Minakata, Kazumi, Maria Alice
Vieira, and Alexandre Fortes.
Partido dos Trabalhadores:
trajetorias. 2d ed. Sao Paulo:
Editora Funda~ao Perseu Abramo,
2003. 143 pp. (Intellectual foundations of Lula's government.)

Hunter, Wendy. "Brazil's New

Oz6rio de Almeida, Anna.
"Continuity and Change in the PT
Government." Centro Studi di

Direction." JournalofDemocracy 14,
no. 2 (2003):151-162.

Politica Internazionale, Working
Papers (November 2004).

Indursky. Freda. "Discurso, lingua
e memoria: Lula-estrutura e acontecimento." Organon,v. 17, no. 35
(2003): 101-122.

Parana, Denise. Lula, elhijo de

Lula (Luiz Inacio da Silva). Tengo
un sueso: cinco propuestas para
cambiar la historia. Barcelona,

Brasil Marcelo Canossa, trans.
Buenos Aires: Editorial El Ateneo,

2003. 464 pp. (Translation of Lula,
oflho de Brasil)
Paula, Antonio de. A economia
politica da mudanfa: os desafios e
os equivocos do inicio do governo

vamos com Lula? Dois cenarios."
ConjunturaEconamica, v. 57, no. 4
(April 2003): 12-15.

Spain: Ediciones Peninsula, 2003.

91 pp. (Features speeches by Lula
from 2002-2003.)

Lula. Belo Horizonte: Autentica,

Giambiagi, Fabio, Josd Guilherme

Manzo, Paolo. Lula, elpresidente
dei poveri: un ex operaio alla
guida del Brasile. Milan, Italy:
Baldini & Castoldi, 2003. 149 pp.

Pochmann, Marcio, ed. Atlas da
exclusdo social no Brasi: os ricos

Reis, and Andre Urani. Reformas

no Brasil. balanfo e agenda. Sao
Paulo: Nova Fronteira, 2004.

543 pp.
Gacek, Stanley. "Lula and Chavez:
Differing Responses to the
Washington Consensus."
New Labor Forum, v. 13, no. 1
(Spring 2004): 40-49.

Medeiros, Jarbas. "Simpatia para o
governo Lula." CarosAmigos, v. 6,
no. 70 (January 2003): 39-40.

2 4

5 pp.

no Brasil

Sao Paulo: Cortez

Editora, 2004. 204 pp. (Features a
regional breakdown of wealth distribution.)
Riethof, Marieke. "Changing
Strategies of the Brazilian Labor

Mendes, Candido. Lula. opfdo
mais que o voto. 5th ed., rev. Rio
de Janeiro: Garamond, 2003.

Genosko, Gary. The Party without
Bosses: Lessons on Anti-Capitalism
from Filix Guattari and Luiz
Indcio 'Lula'da Silva. Winnipeg,
Canada: Arbeiter Ring Pub., 2003.
87 pp. (Based on interviews.)

2003.

347 pp. (Attempts to explain Lula's
success at the polls.)

Movement: From Opposition to
Participation." Latin American
Perspectives,v. 31, no. 6 (November
2004): 31-47.
Rodrigues, Iram Jacome. "O papel
dos sindicatos no governo Lula."
ConjunturaEconomica, v. 57, no. 9
(September 2003): 36-41.
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Publications Update

Sallum, Basilio, and Eduardo
Kugelmas. "Gobierno de Lula:
icontinuidad, avance o retroceso?"

Velasco, Sebastiao C. and Ana Maria
Cruz. "Cambiando el rumbo: la

Winckler, Carlos Roberto, and
Salvatore Santagada. "Entre mundan~a e estagnaqio: os indicadores

In La Argentina de Kirchnery el Brasil

politica exterior del gobierno de
Lula." In La Argentina de Kirchnery

de Lula, edited by Carlos Chacho

el Brasil de Lula, edited by Carlos

IndicadoresEcondmicos FEE,v. 32,

Alvarez (Buenos Aires: Prometeo

Chacho Alvarez (Buenos Aires:

no. 2 (August 2004 ): 155-174.

Libros): 19-36.

Prometeo Libros): 117-132.

Samuels, David

J. "From Socialism

to Social Democracy: Party

Organization and the Transformation of the Workers' Party in
Brazil." ComparativePoliticalStudies
37, no. 9 (2004): 999-1024.
Schmidt, Benicio. "A politica
brasileira a partirde Lula."
Humanidades,no. 49 (January

2003): 54-65.

Vernengo, Matias. "External

Liberalization, Stabilization, and
the Labor Market in Brazil."
Latin American Perspectives, v. 31, no.

sociais na vigencia do Plano Real."

Zobel, Gibby, Jessie Sklair, and
Dylan Howitt. O Presidente
engraxate/ The Shoeshine President
[video recording] Rio de Janeiro:
Filmes; distributed by Latin

4 (July 2004): 62-75.

American Videoarchives, 2003. 1
videocassette. (In Portuguese with

Wheatley, Jonathan. "Widening

English subtitles) U

Expectations." LatinFinance

(September 2004): 33-36. (Discusses
Brazil's economic upturn in August
2004.)

Marian Goslinga is the Latin American and Caribbeanbibliographerat
FloridaInternationalUniversity.

Soares, Laura Tavares, et al.

Governo Lula: decifrando o
enigma. SIo Paulo Viramundo,
2004. 190 pp. (Texts published in
"Outro Brasil" between September
2003 and March 2004.)
Summariva, Marco. Lula: storia,

idee, speranze. Rome:
Malatempora, 2003. 122 pp.
Trotter, Richard. "The New
Economic and Social Model: A
Third Stage of Economic and

Social Development in Brazil in
the Millennium." Journalof the
American Academy of Business, v. 4,
no. 1/2 (May 2004): 178-183.
Vasconcellos, Gilberto Felisberto.
"Medo do imperialismo
financeiro: o vacilo do Governo

Camargo Guarnieri, Brazilian Composer:
A Study of His Creative Life and Works
by Marion Verhaalen
Published in April 2005, this book provides the first comprehensive overview of Guarnieri's life and works in
English, along with a CD compilation of representative
works.

Marion Verhaalen is a teacher, composer and
author who teaches at the Wisconsin Conservatory of
Music in Milwaukee. She has spent time in Brazil as both
researcher and teacher, including a semester on a

Lula." CarosAmigos, v. 7, no. 75

Fulbright Professorship at the Federal University in P6rto

(June 2003): 19-20.

Aleg re.

"A mundanea da matriz
energitica da sociedade brasileira e
a perspectiva de Luiz Inacio Lula
fazer o seu sucessor en 2006."
Caros Amigos, v. 6, no. 68

(November 2002): 17-18.
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BRASA is an international, interdisciplinary group of

Brazilian Studies Association

scholars who support and promote Brazilian studies in
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all fields, especially in the humanities and social sciences.

2301 Vanderbilt Place
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Vanderbilt University

BRASA is dedicated to the promotion of Brazilian studies

Nashville, Tennessee 37235-0031

around the world in general, and in the United States in

U.S.A.

particular.
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615-322-2527 (tel)
615-343-6002 (fax)

BRASA organizes an international congress on Brazilian

studies every other year. The most recent congress,
BRASA VII, was held at the Pontificia Universidade

Cat6lica in Rio de Janeiro in June 2004. BRASA VIII will
take place in October 2006 at Vanderbilt University in
Nashville, Tennessee, USA.

e-mail: brasa@vanderbilt.edu

President:
Timothy J. Power,
Florida International University
Vice President:
Kenneth P. Serbin,

A call for papers and panel proposals will be issued in
April 2005 for BRASA VIII with a deadline for submissions
expected to be in December 2005.

University of San Diego
Executive Director:

Marshall C. Eakin,
Vanderbilt University

BRASA currently has more than 600 members in the
United States, Brazil, Europe, and many other Latin
American countries.

For more information, see our new

website at www.brasa.org.
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